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STATEMENT SHOWING APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION 
This appeal is properly within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. SHOULD THE APPEAL BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANTS FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(7) and 24(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE? 
2. SHOULD THE APPEAL BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE? 
3. HAS APPELLANT ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE 
SO LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE, THUS MAKING THEM ERRONEOUS? 
4. GIVEN THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT, WAS IT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING RULINGS: 
4.1. In December, 1985, Appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with 
appellees Van Alstyne and Robinson, thus creating the Universal Video Partnership 
(hereinafter the "Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business. 
4.2. The terms of the Partnership Agreement required that, in exchange for 
Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 start-up funds for the business, Walsh and Van Alstyne 
agreed: (a) to repay Robinson; (b) to be responsible for the partnership business debts; 
and (c) to share in equal thirds with Robinson the business profits, even though it finally 
turned out that there were no business profits. 
4.3. As a manager of the Partnership's Universal Video business with responsibility 
to manage the business so as to pay its debts, is responsible to repay Robinson for one-half 
of Robinson's loans to the Partnership as set forth in the Facts above. The debt to 
Robinson, after deducting all payments to him to date, totals $10,718.45 plus interest 
through May 21,1989. Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh effective May 
21, 1989 against Walsh for one-half of that sum, $5,359.23. 
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4.4. Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement Walsh and Van Alstyne, 
and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star, 
Oakwood, and other business creditors. Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section 
48-1-15(1), Utah Code, as amended, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against 
Walsh effective May 21, 1989, for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van Alstyne's 
$48,693.65 payments to creditors with his own money. 
4.5. Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson. For 
Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment 
against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages. For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to 
Robinson, Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual 
damages. 
4.6. The Sales Agreement entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2,1985 is void 
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration. Even if the Sales 
Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is void for failure of consideration. 
4.7. Appellant's "Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement" 
should be denied and Defendants should be granted judgment against Plaintiff for $3200.00 
attorney's fees incurred in defending against the motion. 
5. ARE THE ISSUES WHICH APPELLANT RAISES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes are §§48-1-1 through 48-1-40, copied and attached hereto in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: This case arose from a number of disputes between the parties 
concerning their real or silleged partnership interests. 
Course of the proceedings and disposition at trial court: Walsh filed an action against 
Appellees in the Third District Court, alleging breach of a purported sales agreement pursuant 
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to which he allegedly sold all of his partnership interest to Erickson. Appellees counterclaimed 
alleging causes of action including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
unjust enrichment. After a two-day trial, the trial court ruled for Appellees on all of their claims. 
Appellant filed and lost a motion objecting to appellee's proposed forms of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law and Judgment. Appellant filed and lost a Motion for New Trial. Having lost 
at his attempts to prevent entry of the judgments against him from the first trial, appellant next 
filed a Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement, alleging that the parties had 
entered into a settlement agreement to liquidate the judgments from the trial. There was no such 
settlement agreement. Appellant's own arguments at trial supported appellees' firm position that 
there was no settlement agreement by any stretch of the imagination. 
RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATIONS TO THE RECORD 
In December, 1984, appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with appellees 
Van Alstyne and Robinson, creating the Universal Video Partnership (hereinafter the 
"Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business. [T. pp. 4, 47.] Walsh had previous 
experience and success in that line of business. Van Alstyne and Robinson had no such 
experience. Van Alstyne and Robinson entered into the Partnership and thereby assumed 
substantial obligations: (1) in reliance on Walsh's experience and success in the video retail 
business [T. pp. 8, 48-49, 54-55]; (2) in reliance on Walsh's self-professed net worth of 
approximately $243,500.00 [T. pp.59-63, 125-127; and Defendants' Exhibit 10 for Trial #1.]; (3) 
in reliance on Walsh's promises that the Partnership Business would be profitable with certainly 
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enough revenue to pay Jet Star Contract, the Oakwood lease, the Chytraus contract, and the 
$30,000.00 plus interest to Robinson; (4) in reliance on Walsh's assurances that Walsh would 
mortgage his home if necessary to repay Robinson [T. pp. 56-63, 65]; and (5) in reliance on the 
fact that Walsh was an L.D.S. Bishop and returned missionary and lifelong friend of Van Alstyne. 
[T. pp. 5, 223, 296-297.] 
The Partnership agreement included the following terms: 
1. Robinson's obligations: Loan $30,000.00 to Walsh and Van Alstyne [T. pp. 57-
59, 186-187, 192.] for their $25,000.00 payment on the Jet Star Contract and $5,000.00 for 
operating expenses. Robinson was a "silent partner" with no obligation to manage the 
business or pay its debts. [T. pp.297-299.] 
2. Walsh's and Van Alstyne's obligations: 
2.1. Assume joint liability to repay Robinson the full $30,000.00 plus interest 
at 19.41% per annum (3% plus the 16.41% rate Robinson was paying to his bank for the 
second mortgage on his home to get the $30,000.00) [T. pp. 56-59, 91-94,292-293,308-309, 
and p. 310 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendant's Exhibits 18, 27, and 31 from 
Trial #1.] 
2.2. Contribute time and labor to manage and run the business [T. pp. 5, 
134-135.] to pay expenses and make a profit. 
2.3. Assume joint and several liability for the following Partnership Business 
obligations including the following contracts [T. pp. 4, 78-80.]: (a) Jet Star contract to 
purchase the business known as Universal Video (the "Partnership Business"). [T. p. 194, 
198, 226; Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 from Trial #1.]; (b) the "Oakwood Lease" of the premises 
for Partnership Business operations, which obligated Walsh and Van Alstyne to eighteen 
monthly payments of $1,420.00 to $1,440.00. [T. p. 227; Defendant's Exhibit 17 from Trial 
#1.]; and (c) personally guarantee and assume joint and several liability to Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company ("Chytraus") the primary vendor of video tapes for the Partnership 
Business, by signing an Application for Credit and personal guarantee to Oscar E. Chytraus 
Company (hereinafter "Chytraus") [T. p. 82; Defendants' Exhibit 15 from Trial #1.]. 
Neither Walsh nor Van Alstyne intended nor asked Robinson to be responsible for Jet Star 
contract, the Oakwood lease, or any other Universal Video business debts. [T. pp. 69, 79, 
82-83, 226-227.] 
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3. Rights to profits of the Universal Video Business: Walsh, Van Alstyne, and 
Robinson were to share net profits equally after debts to Robinson and third parties had 
been paid. [T. pp. 4, 224, 297-299.] 
Unbeknownst to Van Alstyne or Robinson, before Walsh signed the Jet Star contract in 
December, 1984, and before Robinson provided the $30,000.00 loan, Walsh had been concerned 
that the Partnership Business income would be insufficient to make the Jet Star and Robinson 
payments. [T. pp. 65-66., 193-194.] Walsh did not disclose those financial worries to Van Alstyne 
until after Robinson had already loaned the $30,000.00, and after Walsh and Van Alstyne had 
cosigned on the Jet Star Contract, the Oakwood Lease, and the personal guarantee to Chytraus. 
[T. pp. 65-66, 81.] From the beginning of business operations until May, 1985 when Walsh 
abandoned the Partnership, the Business revenue was so low that Walsh became concerned "that 
the store wasn't going to make it in the spring or the summer without an infusion of some 
additional revenues!;;]" [quotation from T. p. 199; also see T. pp. 65-71,104,198-199.] In March, 
1985, Walsh shocked Van Alstyne by disclosing that he was facing personal bankruptcy and that, 
therefore, he had no assets to pay his obligations on the Partnership Business should the business 
revenue be insufficient. [T. pp. 71, 109.] Consequently, Walsh and Van Alstyne tried, without 
success, to sell the Partnership Business. [T. pp. 69-71,199-200.] With the newfound information 
of Walsh's personal financial distress, Van Alstyne began to look for alternate sources to help pay 
$35,000.00 on the Jet Star contract in June, 1985, and to contribute additional monies for the 
business. [T. pp. 74-75.] From May, 1985, until spring of 1986, Van Alstyne, Robinson, and 
Erickson considered various possibilities and made several proposals back and forth for Erickson 
to become an additional "partner" in the business. No agreement was ever reached. [T. pp. 25, 
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26, 29-30, 44, 74-77, 108-112, 147-149, 176-177; Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 from Trial #1.] 
Negotiations with Erickson notwithstanding, neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson ever 
released or offered to release Walsh from his Partnership obligations for the Jet Star contract, the 
Oakwood lease, the Chytraus debts, the Robinson loan, or any other of his partnership obligations. 
[T. pp. 4 (stipulation), 75, 98-99, 119-120, 135, 150, 155, 384.] In April-May, 1985, without 
informing Van Alstyne or Robinson, Walsh negotiated with Erickson to sell her his Partnership 
interest for $10,000.00, a sales price determined by Walsh and characterized by him as "a fairly 
arbitrary figure." [T. p. 240.] Walsh kept his sales agreement with Erickson secret from Van 
Alstyne and Robinson, although Erickson thought they were awaire of it because Walsh told 
Erickson before she signed any of the sales documents that Van Alstyne had approved. Erickson 
was naive and inexperienced in business matters. [T. pp. 285-291.] She trusted and believed in 
Walsh and thus let him induce her into believing that she was purchasing all of his Partnership 
interest for $10,000. Erickson relied on Walsh's experience in the video business and her belief 
that he was looking out for her best interests because he represented himself as "a good church 
man" whom she could trust him to help her. [T. pp. 149-150, 167.] 
On May 2,1985, Erickson and Walsh executed these four documents which were prepared 
by an attorney of Walsh's at Walsh's request [T. pp. 203, 219] for his purported sale of his 
Partnership interest to Erickson for $10,000.00: (1) Sales Agreement [Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 of Trial 
#1]; (2) Promissory Note [Plaintiffs Exhibit 3 of Trial #1]; (3) Assignment and Assumption 
Agreement [Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 of Trial #1]; and (4) Consent to Assignment [Plaintiffs Exhibit 
5 of Trial #1]. The Consent to Assignment, which was necessary for completion of Walsh's sale 
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to Erickson;was not signed by nor agreed to by three necessary parties: Oakwood Village 
Partnership (for the partnership lease), Jet Star Industries, Inc., and Van Alstyne. [T. pp. 147-149, 
220, 256.] 
Neither Walsh nor Erickson informed Van Alstyne or Robinson about the terms of their 
May 2, 1985, transaction or those four documents. The first time Van Alstyne or Robinson saw 
any of those documents was in autumn of 1986 when they saw a copy of the Promissory Note 
attached the Complaint in this action. [T. pp. 38, 96-99, 293.] Nevertheless, before Erickson 
signed the four documents, Walsh told Erickson that Van Alstyne had approved the documents. 
The purported Sales Agreement between Walsh and Erickson was an ambiguous combination of 
the above-referenced four documents and a number of other oral representations made on various 
occasions. [T. pp. 246-249, 285-290.] Though the Walsh-Erickson sales agreement in totality was 
ambiguous, the Sales Agreement document included these two provisions: (1) Walsh purportedly 
sold his Partnership rights and Partnership interest to Erickson; and (2) Erickson purportedly 
assumed Walsh's Partnership obligations including the following: Jet Star obligation; Chytraus 
obligation; Oakwood Lease; and utilities. [Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 from Trial #1.] 
Walsh told Erickson not to worry about the Partnership debts because all Partnership bills 
"were being paid by the store" and that the "store revenues " would continue to pay the debts. [T. 
pp. 160-162, 230, 240-242.] Further, Walsh told Erickson it was not necessary to pay Robinson 
because there was no contract with Robinson [T. p. 163.] and that, therefore, Robinson "didn't 
have a claim to the store . . . [and that] Robinson couldn't prove that he had given the $30,000." 
[T. p. 288.] From June through October, 1985, Erickson paid Walsh $5,500.00 toward the 
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$10,000.00 to purchase Walsh's partnership interest: $3,000 paid to Walsh May 2,1985 and $500 
per month for the next five months. [T. p. 5.] After paying the October, 1985 $500.00 installment 
to Walsh, Erickson ceased paying Walsh. 
When Walsh negotiated his purported sale to Erickson, he did not disclose to Erickson that 
Van Alstyne had made demand on Walsh to help pay $30,000.00 due Jet Star May 31, 1985. 
Before Van Alstyne made that Jet Star payment Van Alstyne made demand on Walsh to help 
satisfy the Partnership obligations. Walsh refused, telling Van Alstyne he was facing bankruptcy 
and that he hadn't the assets to spend on those obligations. [T. p. 109.] Over several months 
following, Van Alstyne made additional demands on Walsh to contribute to pay Partnership 
Business debts, and each time Walsh refused. [T. pp. 120, 130, 280, 283-284.] Van Alstyne 
mortgaged his family residence for $30,000.00 in June, 1985, to pay on the Jet Star contract. [T. 
pp. 5, 113.] Having been abandoned by their partner Walsh, Van Alstyne and Robinson 
proceeded to wind up the Partnership Business. 
After several unsuccessful attempts to sell the Universal Video business [T42 and 43], Van 
Alstyne and Robinson sold the inventory in June 1986 to Video USA for $25,835.00. All of those 
sales proceeds were applied to pay Partnership Business debts. |[T. p. 5.] Van Alstyne was 
damaged by paying these amounts, either as cash out of pocket or as lost interest, to satisfy 
the business debts: 
$30,000.00 plus interest at 10% per annum June 3,1985 for discounted payment on Jet 
Star [Defendant's Exhibit 25 from Trial #1.] 
$ 5,200.00 plus interest at 13% per annum December 18,1985 for one-half of $6,038.00 
final payment to Chytraus and one-half of $4,362.00 final payment on jet 
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Star contract. 
+ 13,493.65 Total interest at the above specified 10% and 13% rates 
$48,693.65 TOTAL VAN ALSTYNE PAYMENTS TO SATISFY PARTNERSHIP 
BUSINESS DEBTS OWED JOINTLY BY HIM AND WALSH. 
[T. pp. 271-274, 280, 305-309, and pp. 310-312 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendants' 
Exhibit 30 from Trial #1.] 
Robinson paid these sums to satisfy the Partnership Business debts: In addition to the 
initial $30,000.00 loan at 19.41% per annum, Robinson loaned the business $5,200.00 at 13% per 
annum December 18, 1985 for one-half of the $6,038.00 final payment to Chytraus and one-half 
of the $4,632.00 final payment on the Jet Star Contract. The amount that Walsh and Van Alstyne 
jointly owed Robinson through May 21, 1989 was $10,717.45. [T. pp. 91, 294-295, 300-305, and 
pp. 310-312 re Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 from Trial #1; Defendant's Exhibits 18 and 31 from Trial #1.] 
No settlement or liquidation agreement was ever reached between the parties after the trial 
court entered the judgments for appellees. Appellant brought a "Motion for Summary 
Enforcement of Settlement Agreement" alleging such a settlement. That motion was non-
meritorious and had no merit. See transcript of the trial on that motion. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The appeal should be dismissed because appellant made no attempt to marshal the 
evidence. There is no statement of relevant facts in appellants brief. The trial court's rulings 
should be upheld and appellees should be awarded their costs and attorney's fees for defending 
this non-meritorious appeal. 
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1. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANTS FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH RULE 24(a)(7) and 24(e) OF THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 24(a)(7) states: 
. . . A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. 
All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported 
by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
Rule 24(e) states: 
References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant 
to Rule 11(b), to pages of the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of 
the evidence of proceedings . . .. References to exhibits shall include exhibit 
numbers. 
There is no statement of facts in the "Statement of the Case" or anywhere else in appellant's brief. 
Further, appellant bases his arguments on many facts which were not in evidence at trial, and he 
fails to cite the source of those purported facts. In Steele v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 at 34, 845 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this court ruled that 
An appellant's brief must contain a "statement of the facts relevant to the issues 
presented for review," and "[a]ll statements of fact and references to the proceedings 
below shall be supported by citations to the record." Likewise, subsection (a)(9a) 
of Rule 24 requires the argument in a brief to contain "citations to the . . . parts of 
the record relied on" therein. Briefs that do not comply with Rule 24 "may be 
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney 
fees against the offending lawyer." Utah R. App. Procedure 24(k). 
If a party fails to provide a statement of the facts along with a citation to the 
record where those facts are supported, we will assume the correctness of the 
judgment. [Citations.] 
If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and citation of the pages in the record 
where those facts are supported, the court will assume the correctness of the judgment below. 
2. THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
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MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
This court's ruling in Oneida v. Oneida, 236 U.A.R. 24, 25 (Utah App. 1994) places a heavy 
burden on the appellant who challenges the trial court's findings of fact: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We 
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when challenging 
factual finding. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] 
from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the appellants resist .' [Citations.] Once 
appellants have established every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they 
then must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. [Citations.] They must show the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," 
thus making them "clearly erroneous." [Citations.] 
Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty to marshal is not properly discharged, we 
refuse to consider the merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings 
as valid." [Citations.] 
Not only did appellant make no effort to marshal evidence in his brief, he did not even 
acknowledge the concept of marshaling evidence in his brief. Because appellant has failed to 
marshal the evidence. The court should uphold all of the trial court's findings of fact. 
3. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH, INDEED HE DID NOT EVEN 
SHOW AN ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH, THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SO 
LACKING IN SUPPORT AS TO BE AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE, 
THUS MAKING THEM ERRONEOUS. 
Because appellant has failed to meet his burden in challenging the trial court's findings, the 
findings of fact must be upheld. 
4. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT APPLIED 
UTAH PARTNERSHIP LAW TO ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND MADE THESE RULINGS 
ERV40606.BRF 
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AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS [R. at 000543-000566, in addendum attached hereto]: 
4.1. In December, 1985, Appellant entered into an oral Partnership agreement with 
appellees Van Alstyne and Robinson, thus creating the Universal Video Partnership 
(hereinafter the "Partnership") for the purpose of retail video business. 
4.2. The terms of the Partnership Agreement required that, in exchange for 
Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 start-up funds for the business, Walsh and Van Alstyne 
agreed: (a) to repay Robinson; (b) to be responsible for the partnership business debts; 
and (c) to share in equal thirds with Robinson the business profits, even though it finally 
turned out that there were no business profits. 
4.3. As a manager of the Partnership's Universal Video business with responsibility 
to manage the business so as to pay its debts, is responsible to repay Robinson for one-half 
of Robinson's loans to the Partnership as set forth in the Facts above. The debt to 
Robinson, after deducting all payments to him to date, totals $10,718.45 plus interest 
through May 21, 1989. Robinson is entitled to judgment against Walsh effective May 21, 
1989 against Walsh for one-half of that sum, $5,359.23. 
4.4. Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement Walsh and Van Alstyne, 
and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star, 
Oakwood, and other business creditors. Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section 
48-1-15(1), Utah Code, as amended, Van Alstyne is entitled to judgment against Walsh 
effective May 21, 1989, for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van Alstyne's 
$48,693.65 payments to creditors with his own money. 
4.5. Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson. For 
Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment 
against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages. For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to 
Robinson, Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual 
damages. 
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Walsh breached his 
fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson in many ways,, First, before borrowing the 
$30,000.00 from Robinson to purchase the Universal Video business under the Jet Star 
Contract, Walsh was wary of the debt service on the contract and was concerned that the 
business revenue would not cover the debt serve, let alone the loan payments to Robinson 
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and the other business debts, and yet he borrowed the $30,000.00 from Robinson and had 
Van Alstyne cosign with Walsh on the underlying contracts and personal guarantee to 
Chytraus without warning Van Alstyne and Robinson of the risk involved. 
Second, Walsh breached his fiduciary duties when he abandoned the 
Partnership May 2, 1985, leaving Van Alstyne to manage and pay the debts of a business 
in which he had virtually no experience, and leaving the debt to Robinson unpaid. 
Further, Walsh breached his fiduciary duties when he attempted to sell his 
partnership interest to Erickson without fully disclosing to Van Alstyne and Robinson the 
terms of the sale and without informing them that he received $5,500.00 from Erickson. 
The trial Court found by clear and convincing evidence that the said breaches of 
fiduciary duty were done by Walsh in a manner that showed a knowing and reckless 
indifference to and disregard of the rights of Van Alstyne and Robinson, and that Walsh 
either knew or should have known that he said conduct would, in a high degree of 
probability, result in substantial harm to Van Alstyne and Robinson. Appellant has failed 
to rebut those judicial findings. 
4.6. The Sales Agreement entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2,1985 is void 
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration. 
Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is void for failure 
of consideration. Section I of the Agreement purported to convey to Erickson all of 
Walsh's one-third partnership rights and interest in the Universal Video business. Walsh 
did not have the authority or right to convey his Partnership rights. Walsh's sale to 
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Erickson was tantamount to the proverbial "sale of the Brooklyn Bridge". Walsh's promise 
to convey all of his partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because it required approval 
(never obtained) by Van Alstyne and Robinson. 
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a statement. . . such . 
. . that the person making it commits himself to nothing, the alleged 
"promise" is said to be "illusory". An illusory promise, neither binds the 
person making it, [Citation], nor functions as consideration for a return 
promise. 
Resource Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company Inc., 706 P.2d 
1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Thus the Sales Agreement is void for lack of consideration 
because Walsh's promise to convey his Partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because 
it committed Walsh to nothing because he had no legal right to make that commitment 
without consent from Van Alstyne and Robinson. 
4.7. Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it would 
be void for failure of consideration. 
When consideration is lacking, there is no contract. When consideration fails, there was 
a contract when the agreement was made, but the promised performance has failed. 
DeMentas v. Estate of Tallas, 95 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 1988). Walsh failed to 
deliver the consideration (his Partnership rights) to Erickson because he was never 
authorized to do so by the other partners, Van Alstyne and Robinson. 
4.8. All partners' consents are required for sale of partner's rights: Pursuant to 
Sections 48-1-21 and 48-1-24, Utah Code, as amended, both Van Alstyne's and Robinson's 
consent would be required to imbue Erickson with Walsh's Partnership rights (as opposed 
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to his mere Partnership interest, which is the partner's right to profits) to manage or 
administer Partnership business or affairs. 
4.8.1. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson consented, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement. 
Van Alstyne and Robinson did not even see the document until this lawsuit was 
filed. After Erickson signed the documents and began paying Walsh the $500.00 
monthly installment, several months of arguments ensued between Erickson and 
Van Alstyne because Van Alstyne and Robinson did not ever accept Erickson as a 
full one-third partner to replace Walsh. 
4.8.2. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson released Walsh from his 
Partnership obligations. 
The fact that Van Alstyne and Robinson made significant Partnership business 
decisions after May 1, 1985 without consulting Walsh does not imply a release of 
Walsh or a consent to his sale to Erickson. Walsh abandoned the partnership May 
2, 1985. Section 48-1-6, Utah Code, as amended, provides that a partner who 
abandons the Partnership business does not have to be included in other partners1 
decisions to sell or assign Partnership property. There was no novation to substitute 
Erickson for Walsh to pay Walsh's Partnership obligations. "For a novation to 
occur, there must be (1) an existing and valid contract, (2) an agreement to the new 
contract by all parties, (3) a new valid contract, and (4) an extinguishment of the 
old contract by the new one." Hormana v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346,1352-1353 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
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4.9. Neither mistake of fact nor mistake of law by Erickson or Walsh would 
validate the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement. 
Even if Walsh and Erickson both mistakenly believed when they entered in to the 
Sales Agreement that Van Alstyne and Robinson had consented to the Agreement, that 
mistake would not be grounds for validating the Sales Agreement. Moonev v. GR and 
Associates. 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987). To allow such a mistake of fact to validate 
the Sales Agreement would be analogous to validating a contract for sale of the Brooklyn 
Bridge by a seller who believed he had legal rights to sell the bridge but who in fact did 
not. Rather than being validated because it was obtained by mistake, the Sales Agreement 
is voidable because obtained by mistake. 
As to mistake of law, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Walsh's or Erickson's 
mistake in legal interpretation of the Sales Agreement (mistakenly believing the Agreement 
was legally valid because of mistaken belief that partner's consent is not legal requirement 
for other partner's sale of his Partnership rights) would not be grounds sufficient for 
validating the Agreement. Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982). 
4.10The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement is not severable so as to make Erickson 
liable to Walsh for the $10,000,00 contract price and award her only Walsh's Partnership 
interest (right to accounts receivable) instead of all of his Partnership rights. 
Partners' management rights are not assignable without the other partners1 consent. There 
is no severability clause in the Sales Agreement. Section I of the Sales Agreement 
purports to sell all of Walsh's Partnership rights and interest in one total package. The 
Sales Agreement does not break down the $10,000.00 sales price into units separately 
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specifying a certain sum for Walsh's Partnership rights and another sum for Walsh's 
Partnership interest. Further, there was no indication by Walsh or Erickson at trial of any 
intent by either of them that the contract be severable. "A contract is severable or entire 
depending on the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract." 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2e 406, 408 (Utah 1980). 
4.11. Appellant's "Motion for Summary Enforcement of Settlement Agreement" 
should be denied and Defendants should be allowed to collect their judgments against 
Plaintiff for $3200.00 attorneys fees incurred in defending against the motion. 
As with the other issues, appellant made no attempt to marshal the evidence to 
attack the trial court's findings. There is no credible evidence of any settlement agreement. 
Indeed, appellant's own arguments at trial supported appellees' firm position that their 
judgments entered against appellant in the first trial had not been satisfied, settled, or 
otherwise liquidated. 
5. THE ISSUES WHICH APPELLANT RAISES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Appellant's arguments number THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT, NINE, and 
TEN should be stricken because they are all based on erroneous and unsubstantiated facts and 
conclusions contrary to the findings of fact in the court below. 
Appellant's arguments number TWELVE and THIRTEEN should be stricken because they 
raise issues not raised at the trial court level. John Deere v. A&H Equipment 241 U.A.R. 17. 
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CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The appeal should be dismissed forthwith so that appellees may proceed to collect their 
long overdue moneys for judgments awarded them by the trial court: 
Judgments entered almost \ years ago, October 30,1990, for Defendants against Plaintiff, (not 
including interest since May 31, 1990 or post-judgment costs) total $51,563.54 as follows: 
Judgment for Erickson; 
$5,500.00 Principal judgment for Erickson 
+2,755.75 10% pre-judgment interest from 10/31/85 
through 10/31/90 ($1.51 per diem) 
$8,255.75 TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest through 
10/31/90 
+ 1,566.38 12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90 
through 5/31/92 ($2.71 per diem) 
$9,822.13 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR ERICKSON 
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include post-judgment 
costs, and does not include interest accruing 
on judgment at 12% per annum after May 31, 1992) 
Judgment for Robinson; 
$5,359.23 Principal judgment for Robinson 
+ 1,849.26 10% pre-judgment interest from 5/21/87 through 
10/31/90 ($1.47 per diem) 
$7,208.49 TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest 
through 10/31/90 
+ 1,396.86 12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90 
through 5/31/92 ($2.37 per diem) 
$8,578.35 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR ROBINSON 
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include post-judgment 
costs, and does not include interest accruing 
on judgment at 12% per annum after May 31, 1992) 
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Judgment for Van Alstyne; 
$24,346.82 Principal judgment for Van Alstyne 
+ 3,521.76 10% pre-judgment interest from 5/21/89 to 
10/31/90 TS6.67 per diem) 
$27,868.58 TOTAL JUDGMENT with pre-judgment interest 
through 10/31/90 
+ $ 5,294.48 12% post-judgment interest from 10/31/90 
through 5/31/92 ($9.16 per diem) 
$33,163.06 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST FOR VAN ALSTYNE 
THROUGH MAY 31,1992 (does not include post-
judgment costs, and does not include interest 
accruing on judgment at 12% per annum after May 
31, 1992.) 
The appeal is without merit and was filed solely to delay and avoid payment of the 
appellees' judgments. Pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Appellees should be awarded judgment against appellant for their costs and attorney's fees in 
defense, of the appeal. 
DATED this day of July, 1994. 
rney for Appellees 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-2 
48-1-1. Definition of terms. 
In this chapter; 
"Court" includes every court and judge having jurisdiction in the case. 
"Business" includes every trade, occupation or profession. 
"Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and other as-
sociations. 
"Bankrupt" includes bankrupt under the federal bankruptcy laws or 
insolvent under any state insolvency law. 
"Conveyance" includes every assignment, lease, mortgage or encum-
brance. 
"Real property" includes land and any interest or estate in land. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, J 2; R.S. 1933 & C. tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, \ 
1943, 69-1-1. New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Uniform Laws. — Jurisdictions that have Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Ore-
enacted the Uniform Partnership Act are Ala- gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caro-
bama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washing-
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken- Cross-References. — Banks by partnership 
tucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich- forbidden, § 7-3-2. 
igan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon- Insolvency defined, § 25-6-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS -
Cited in Gary Energy Corp. v. Metro Oil 
Prods., 114 F.R.D. 69 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES ! 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- Determination of citizenship of partnership, 
ship §§ 1 to 4. for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 1, 2. USCS § 1332(a), 83 A.L.R. Fed. 136. 
A.L.R. — Joint venturers' comparative lia-
bility for losses, in absence of express agree-
ment, 51 A.L.R.4th 371. 
<< 
48-1-2. Interpretation of knowledge and notice. 
(1) Within the meaning of this chapter, a person is deemed to have knowl-
edge of a fact not only when he has actual knowledge thereof, but also when ^ 
he has knowledge of such other facts that to act in disregard of them shows ( 
bad faith. I 
(2) A person has notice of a fact within the meaning of this chapter when . 
the person who claims the benefit of the notice: i 
(a) states the fact to such person; or, 
(b) delivers through the mail, or by other means of communication, a
 v 
written statement of the fact to such person, or to a proper person at his 
place of business or residence. I 
History: L. 1921, ch. 69, § 3; U.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 69-1-2. 
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8 .1 -3 PARTNERSHIP 
8-1-3. "Partnership" defined. 
A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-
wners a business for profit. 
But any association formed under any other statute of this state, or any 
tatute adopted by authority other than the authority of this state, is not a 
partnership under this chapter, unless such association would have been a 
artnership in this state prior to the adoption of this chapter; but this chapter 
hall apply to limited partnerships except in so far as the statutes relating to 
uch partnerships are inconsistent herewith. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 6; R.S. 1933 & C. 
943, 69-1-3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence of partnership, 
foint stock company. 
Vlining partnership. 
Requisites of partnership. 
Evidence of p a r t n e r s h i p . 
Evidence relating to joint operation of a cafe 
established that relationship of parties was 
hat of partnership as defined in this section. 
Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 
122 (1958). 
Jo in t s tock c o m p a n y . 
A joint stock company is generally classified 
as a partnership possessing some of the charac-
teristics of a corporation. Rocky Mt. Stud Farm 
Co. v. Lunt, 46 Utah 299, 151 P. 521 (1915). 
Mining partnership. 
For cases discussing common-law mining 
partnership, see Bentley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 
396, 94 P. 736 (1908); Mud Control Lahs. v. 
Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954). 
Requisites of partnership. 
The requisites of partnership are that par-
ties must have joined together to carry on 
trade or adventure for their common benefit, 
each contributing property or services, and 
having community of interest in profits. Bent-
ley v. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908). 
An organization of workers, formed for the 
purpose of performing and undertaking con-
tracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the es-
sential elements of either a general or limited 
partnership, where all the equipment used by 
workers belonged to one individual who had 
sole authority to make contracts for himself 
and the organization, and where workers were 
not entitled to share in profits equally or on 
any fixed percentage basis, were not charge-
able for losses, nor permitted to determine the 
means or methods of operating. Johanson Bros. 
Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118 Utah 384, 222 
P.2d 563 (1950). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 1 to 11. 
C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 1 to 21. 
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement be-
tween real-estate agents to share commissions, 
71 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Propriety, under state statutes or bar associ-
ation or court rules, of formation of multistate 
law partnership or professional service corpo-
ration, 6 A.L.R.4th 1251. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 1 to 26. 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-4 
48-1-3.1. Joint venture defined — Application of chapter. 
(1) A joint venture is an association of two or more persons to carry on as 
co-owners of a single business enterprise. 
(2) This chapter governs the property and transfer rights of joint ventures. 
History: C. 1953, 48-1-3.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 14, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS for the venture's entire loss. Producer's Live-
stock Mktg. Ass'n v. Christensen, 588 P.2d 156 
Agreement to share profits required. (Utah 1978). 
Continuation of venture presumed. 
Joint venture not found. Joint venture not found. 
Litigation. There was no joint adventure or partnership 
Shared facilities. by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint 
adventurers had not given his consent to being 
Agreement to share profits required. held out as a joint adventurer with the person 
To establish a joint adventure there must be
 m a k i n g the representation, and where the 
an agreement, express or implied, for the shar-
 t h i r ( j person to whom the representation had 
ing of profits. Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165,
 b e e n m a d e h a d n o t r e i i e d u p o n i t B a t e s v 
239 P.2d 749 (1952). Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952). 
Fact that the person who finances the sale of 
a used car thereby realizes profit does not Litigation. 
make him a joint adventurer with the seller. Joint venturers may sue in the name of the 
Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 joint venture. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine. 767 
(1952). P 2 d 499 (Utah 1988). 
Continuation of venture presumed. Shared facilities. 
Fact that one joint venturer reimbursed the Used car dealers who share a lot, building, 
other for the latter's contribution did not, in and telephone do not become joint adventurers 
itself, indicate termination of the joint venture, by reason of that working arrangement. Bates 
thereby making first joint venturer responsible v. Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Joint Ven- tween real-estate agents to share commissions, 
tures §§ 1 to 71. 71 A.L.R.3d 586. 
C.J .S . — 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures §§ 1 to Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R. 1th 
73. 1234. 
A.L.R. — Construction of agreement be-
48-1-4. Rules for determining the existence of a partner-
ship. 
In determining whether a partnership exists these rules shall apply: 
(1) Except as provided by Section 48-1-13, persons who are not partners 
as to each other are not partners as to third persons. 
(2) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by entireties, joint 
property, common property, or part ownership does not of itself establish 
a partnership, whether such co-owners do or do not share any profits 
made by the use of the property. 
(3) The sharing of gross returns does not of itself establish a partner-
ship, whether or not the persons sharing them have a joint or common 
right or interest in any property from which the returns are derived. 
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48-1-4 PARTNERSHIP 
(4) The receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is 
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such 
inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment: 
(a) As a debt by installments or otherwise. 
(b) As wages of an employee or rent to a landlord. 
(c) As an annuity to a widow or representative of a deceased part-
ner. 
(d) As interest on a loan, though the amounts of payment vary 
with the profits of the business. 
(e) As the consideration for the sale of the good will of a business or 
other property by installments or otherwise. 
History: L. 1921, ch . 89, § 7; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 69-1-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidence. 
— Burden of proof. 
— Presumptions. 
Existence of partnership. 
Cited. 
Ev idence . 
— B u r d e n of proof. 
In action for accounting and dissolution of 
partnership, plaintiff had burden of proving 
existence of partnership. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934). 
— P r e s u m p t i o n s . 
The fact that two persons share profits of a 
business raises a presumption that they are 
partners. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 
259 P. 313 (1927). 
Where payment of a portion of profits to de-
fendant constituted partial reimbursement for 
defendant's expenditures in connection with 
the business premises, there was no presump-
tion of partnership, and plaintiff was required 
to meet his burden of proof without the aid of 
the presumption. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 
P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
Exis tence of p a r t n e r s h i p . 
Evidence held insufficient to show tha t a 
partnership was ever formed, but did show that 
a business arrangement was entered into that 
constituted a preliminary to a partnership. 
Millett v. Langston, 8 Utah 2d 15, 327 P.2d 253 
(1958). 
Where defendant had turned over operation 
of tavern, equipment, furnishing, and inven-
tory that he owned to plaintiff pursuant to an 
agreement to divide profits from the business 
equally, plaintiff had full authority to manage 
the business, including purchase of supplies, 
payment of bills, and keeping of books, and in-
come from the business was reported on part-
nership income tax forms, trial court could 
properly find that a partnership existed, enti-
tling plaintiff to half the compensation paid for 
disruption of business upon condemnation of 
the building where the tavern was located. 
Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975). 
Evidence established the existence of a part-
nership where two parties entered into an 
agreement requiring them to work together to 
obtain a zoning change and to develop land, 
and providing for sharing the profits derived 
from their joint efforts; classification of the 
project as a single undertaking rather than a 
continuous business transaction did not render 
the trial court's finding of a partnership erro-
neous. Nupetco Assocs. v. Jenkins , 669 P.2d 
877 (Utah 1983) (decided before enactment of 
§ 48-1-3.1). 
Cited in Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. 
ship §§ 1 to 4. 
59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S Partnership § 1. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 1 to 26. 
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GENERAL PARTNERSHIP 48-1-5 
48-1-5. Partnership property. 
All property originally brought into the partnership stock, or subsequently 
acquired by purchase or otherwise on account of the partnership, is partner-
ship property. 
Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership 
funds is partnership property. 
Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership name. Title 
so acquired can be conveyed only in the partnership name. 
A conveyance to a partnership in the partnership name, though without 
words of inheritance, passes the entire estate of the grantor, unless a contrary 
intent appears. 
History: L. 1921, ch . 89, § 8; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 69-1-5. 
Cross-References . — Conveyances, Title 
57, Chapter 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Assignment for benefit of creditors. 
Death of partner. 
Property purchased with partnership funds. 
Security for loan. 
Assignment for benefit of creditors. 
Assignment of property of partnership for 
benefit of its creditors is not rendered invalid 
by noninclusion therein of individual property 
of each partner. Wilson v. Sullivan, 17 Utah 
341, 53 P. 994 (1898). 
Death of partner. 
In suit by surviving partner against widow 
of deceased partner to recover title to certain 
real property held in the name of defendant, 
evidence held sufficient to require such land to 
be held in trust for partnership. Matson v. 
Matson, 56 Utah 394, 190 P. 943 (1920). 
Property purchased with partnership 
funds. 
Property purchased with partnership funds 
is prima facie the property of the firm, though 
the title is taken in the individual name of one 
or more of the partners. Deming v. Moss, 40 
Utah 501, 121 P. 971 (1912); Staats v. Staats, 
63 Utah 470, 226 P. 667 (1924). 
Although two partners entered into a con-
tract in their individual names to purchase 
lands, assignments of the contract referred to 
these buyers as individuals, the property was 
referred to as tha t of the individuals by name 
in the trial, and the parties submitted memo-
randums concerning the issue of cotenancy, 
nevertheless the partnership was the pur-
chaser because of the use of partnership funds. 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976). 
Secur i ty for loan . 
Where partnership money was loaned and 
note and mortgage securing the indebtedness 
were taken in name of partner, note and mort-
gage were property of partnership so that part-
ner could not be charged with amount of loan 
upon dissolution of partnership. Buzianis v. 
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 329 to 356. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 69. 
A.L.R. — Insurance on life of partner as 
partnership asset, 56 A.L.R.3d 892. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 67. 
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48-1-6. Partner agent of partnership as to partnership 
business. 
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its busi-
ness, and the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership 
name of any instrument for apparently carrying on in the usual way the 
business of the partnership of which he is a member, binds the partnership, 
unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the partnership 
in the particular matter and the person with whom he is dealing has knowl-
edge of the fact that he has no such authority. 
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the 
business of the partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership, 
unless authorized by the other partners. 
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned 
the business, one or more but less than all of the partners have no authority 
to: 
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the 
assignee's promise to pay the debts of the partnership. 
(b) Dispose of the good will of the business. 
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the 
ordinary business of the partnership. 
(d) Confess a judgment. 
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference. 
(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall 
bind the partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction. 
History: L. 1921, ch . 89, § 9; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 69-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS power to bind his associates by engagements 
with third persons to extent that member of 
Burden of proof. trading or commercial firm may do. Bentley v. 
Common-law mining partnership. Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908). 
Duties of partners inter se. 
Manner of entering into transaction. Dut ies of p a r t n e r s in te r se . 
Power of individual partner to bind partner- Partners stand in fiduciary relation to each 
ship other, and it is duty of each partner to observe 
Borrowing money. utmost good faith towards his copartners in all 
— Conveyance of property. dealings and transactions that come within 
— Nontrading partnership. scope of partnership business. Nelson v. 
Matsch, 38 Utah 122, 110 P. 865, 1912D Ann. 
Bu rden of proof. Cas. 1242 (1910). 
Plaintiff, whose action was based on transac-
tion with individual partner that was not M a n n e r of en te r ing in to t r a n s a c t i o n . 
within ordinary or apparent scope of partner- Where transaction by one partner is for ben-
ship business, had burden of showing either efit of partnership and is within general or ap-
that partner had special authority in matter or parent scope of its business, it is immaterial 
that transaction was ratified by other partners that such partner's name alone is signed to 
whom plaintiff sought to hold liable. Peterson writing that evidences transaction. Salt Lake 
v. Armstrong, 24 Utah 96, 66 P. 767 (1901). City Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 
1058 (1901). 
Common- law min ing p a r t n e r s h i p . 
An important distinction between ordinary P o w e r of ind iv idua l p a r t n e r to b ind pa r t -
trading partnership and mining partnership is n e r s h i p . 
that member of mining partnership has not the Partner, without special authority in matter, 
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has no power to bind partnership in transac- — C o n v e y a n c e of property. 
tion which is not within ordinary or apparent Where the title to real property is in the 
scope of partnership business, and person deal- name of one or more or all of the partners, or of 
ing with such partner is charged with notice of a third person in trust for the partnership, a 
such fact. Peterson v. Armstrong, 24 Utah 96, conveyance executed by a partner in the part-
66 P. 767 (1901). nership name, or in his own name, passes the 
As between partnership and person dealing equitable interest of the partnership, provided 
with one of its members in good faith, without t h e a c t J i s T w i t h i n t h e a " t h , o r i t y o f t h e Pf1*-
notice, it is immaterial whether partner acts n e r u n d * r t h e P™™\°™ of Subsection (1). Bill-
fairly with his copartners in transaction, so l n ^ V Q O C " ° n * n i Fn L * d £ n [* ? T a « *' i L * *u- r L V- Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988). long as he acts within scope of partnership 
business and his authority. Salt Lake City —Nontrading p a r t n e r s h i p . 
Brewing Co. v. Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. Where partnership is engaged in stage busi-
1058 (1901). ness, or carrying of mails, passengers, and ex-
. press, one of partners has, prima facie, no au-
—Borrowing money. thority to bind firm or another partner by 
When money is borrowed by partner on transaction relating to business of mining, and 
credit of partnership, according to usual course he who would seek to hold firm liable by virtue 
of its business and within general scope of its
 0f such transaction has burden of showing au-
authority, partnership is liable for money thus thority in contracting partner to enter into it. 
borrowed. Salt Lake City Brewing Co. v. Cavanaugh v. Salisbury, 22 Utah 465, 63 P. 39 
Hawke, 24 Utah 199, 66 P. 1058 (1901). (1900). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for 
ship §§ 249 to 251. tort of partner in law firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298. 
C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 136. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 125. 
48-1-7. Conveyance of real property of partnership. 
Where title to real property is in the partnership name, any partner may 
convey title to such property by a conveyance executed in the partnership 
name; but the partnership may recover such property, unless the partner's act 
binds the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), or unless such 
property has been conveyed by the grantee or a person claiming through such 
grantee to a holder for value without knowledge that the partner in making 
the conveyance has exceeded his authority. 
Where title to real property is in the name of the partnership a conveyance 
executed by a partner in his own name passes the equitable interest of the 
partnership, provided the act is one within the authority of the partner under 
the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1). 
Where title to real property is in the name of one or more but not all of the 
partners, and the record does not disclose the right of the partnership, the 
partners in whose name the title stands may convey title to such property, but 
the partnership may recover such property, if the partners' act does not bind 
the partnership under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1), unless the pur-
chaser or his assignee is a holder for value without knowledge. 
Where the title to real property is in the name of one or more or all of the 
partners, or in a third person in trust for the partnership, a conveyance exe-
cuted by a partner in the partnership name, or in his own name, passes the 
equitable interest of the partnership, provided the act is one within the au-
thority of the partner under the provisions of Section 48-1-6(1). 
Where the title to real property is in the names of all the partners a convey-
ance executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such property. 
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His tory: L. 1921, ch . 89, § 10; R.S. 1933 & Cross -References . — Conveyances, Title 
C. 1943, 69-1-7. 57, Chapter 1 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS nership name, or in his own name, passes the 
equitable interest of the partnership, provided 
Equitable interest
 t n e a c t 1S o n e w , t h in the authority of the part-
Cited
 n e r under the provisions of § 48-1-6(1) Bill-
Equ i t ab le in te res t . »ng9 v Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd (In re Granada, 
Where the title to real property is in the Inc ), 92 Bankr 501 (Bankr D Utah 1988) 
name of one or more or all of the partners, or of 
a third person ,n trust for the partnership, a Cited in Gary Energy Corp v Metro Oil 
conveyance executed by a partner in the part- Prods , 114 F R D 69 (D Utah 1987) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 154 
ship §§ 304 to 308 Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *=» 138 
48-1-8. Partnership bound by admission of partner. 
An admission or representation made hy any partner concerning partner-
ship affairs within the scope of his authority as conferred by this chapter is 
evidence against the partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 11; R S. 1933 & Cross-References . — Party admission, 
C. 1943, 69-1-8. Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(2) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 167 
ship §§ 754 to 757, 939 Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 152 
48-1-9. Partnership charged with knowledge of or notice 
to partner. 
Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the 
knowledge of the partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a 
partner or then present to his mind, and the knowledge of any other partner 
who reasonably could and should have communicated it to the acting partner, 
operates as notice to or knowledge of the partnership, except in the case of a 
fraud on the partnership committed by or with the consent of that partner. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 12; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-9. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d — 59A Am J u r 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C J S Partnership § 175 
ship §§ 252 to 256 Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 159 
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48-1-10. Partnership bound by partner's wrongful act. 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordi-
nary course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his 
copartners loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the 
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to 
the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 13; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 6 9 1 1 0 . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rogers v. M O Bitner Co , 738 P 2d 
1029 (Utah 1987) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am J u r 2d Partner- Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses, or 
ship §§ 647 to 661, 667 to 672 allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82 A L R 3d 
C.J .S . — 68 C J . S Partnership §§ 168 to 822 
171 Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 153(1) 
A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for 
tort of partner in law firm, 70 A L R 3d 1298 
48-1-11. Partnership bound by partner's breach of trust. 
The partnership is bound to make good the loss: 
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority 
receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) where the partnership in the course of its business receives money 
or property of a third person and the money or property so received is 
misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 14; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-11. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. J u r 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C J S Partnership § 169 
ship §§ 662 to 666 Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 153(2) 
48-1-12. Nature of partner's liability. 
All partners are liable: 
(1) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership 
under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
(2) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but 
any partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership 
contract. 
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His tory: L. 1921, ch . 89, 5 15; R.S. 1933 & 
: . 1943, 69-1-12. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint and several liability. 
Parties. 
Satisfaction of debts. 
Service on partners. 
Cited. 
J o i n t a n d seve ra l l iabili ty. 
Where partners failed to comply with the for-
mer Utah Limited Partnership Act. they were 
liable as general partners and were jointly and 
severally liable for a partial failure of consider-
ation paid by the partnership for stock. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 265 F.2d 
227 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S. 
Ct. 1452, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1545 (1959). 
Where a right of recovery, in a stockholder's 
derivative action against a life insurance com-
pany, was based on the fraud of the directors in 
acting both as directors and as members of the 
partnership that organized the company, the 
liability of the directors was joint and several. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 170 F. Supp. 
150 (D. Utah 1958), afTd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 1452, 3 L. 
Ed. 2d 1545 (1959). 
Pa r t i e s . 
An individual member may not be sued on 
an alleged claim of only an individual obliga-
tion and recovery had against him on proof of a 
partnership obligation not qualifying under 
Subsection (1) of this section as a joint and sev-
eral obligation, but coming under Subsection 
(2) as only a joint obligation, unless the part-
nership or all the members thereof are made 
parties. Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 Utah 
47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932). 
Sat isfact ion of d e b t s . 
Partnership debts and obligations coming 
within the scope of Subsection (2) must be sat-
isfied by partnership assets to the extent any 
exist before a creditor can seek satisfaction 
from the individual assets of a partner. 
McCune & McCune v. Mountain Bell Tel., 758 
P.2d 914 (Utah 1988). 
Service on p a r t n e r s . 
If a partner 's liability is joint ra ther than 
joint and several, each defendant must be indi-
vidually served in order to be liable. Barber v. 
Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1990). 
Cited in First Sec. Bank v. Felger, 658 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987); Billings v. Key 
Bank (In re Granada, Inc.), 115 Bankr. 702 
(Bankr. D. Utah 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. - - 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 638 to 672. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 180. 
A.L.R. — Vicarious liability of attorney for 
tort of partner in law firm, 70 A.L.R.3d 1298. 
damages for wrongful act of copartner, 14 
A.L.R.4th 1335. 
Partnership or joint venture exclusion in 
contractor's or other similar comprehensive 
general liability insurance policy, 57 A.L.R.4th 
1155. 
Derivative liability of partner for punitive Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 165. 
48-1-13. Partner by estoppel. 
(1) When a person by words spoken or written or by conduct represents 
himself, or consents to another's representing him, to anyone as a partner, in 
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is 
liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made who has 
on the faith of such representation given credit to the actual or apparent 
partnership, and, if he has made such representation or consented to its being 
made in a public manner, he is liable to such person, whether the representa-
tion has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit 
by, or with the knowledge of, the apparent partner making the representation 
or consenting to its being made. 
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(a) When a partnership liability results, he is liable as if he were an 
actual member of the partnership. 
(b) When no partnership liability results, he is liable jointly with the 
other persons, if any, so consenting to the contract or representation as to 
incur liability; otherwise, separately. 
(2) When a person has been thus represented to be a partner in an existing 
partnership, or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is an agent of 
the persons consenting to such representation to bind them to the same extent 
and in the same manner as though he were a partner in fact, with respect to 
persons who rely upon the representation. Where all the members of an exist-
ing partnership consent to the representation, a partnership act or obligation 
results; but in all other cases it is the joint act or obligation of the person 
acting and the persons consenting to the representation. 
His tory : L. 1921, ch. 88, § 18; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-13. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Requis i t es . the material used and was present during the 
There was no partnership or joint adventure delivery and use of construction materials on 
by estoppel where one of the two alleged joint the premises. Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 
adventures had not given his consent to being Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517 (1957). 
held out as a joint adventurer with the person Defendant was not liable as a partner in an 
making the representation, and where the enterprise by estoppel even though payment 
third person to whom the representation had for goods was made by check on the account of 
been made had not relied upon it. Bates v. defendant, defendant was sometimes listed as 
Simpson, 121 Utah 165, 239 P.2d 749 (1952). a purchaser on the sales invoices, and defen-
Partnership liability to mechanics' lienors dant filed applications for licenses to engage in 
was found where defendant had stated to business with the state tax commission. Phil-
others that he was or intended to become an- lips Mfg. Co. v. Putnam, 29 Utah 2d 69, 504 
other's partner, and where he paid for a part of P.2d 1376(1973). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 24, 33 to 
ship §§ 145 to 147, 673 to 697. 38. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 21. 
48-1-14. Liability of incoming partner. 
A person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership is liable for all 
the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as if he had 
been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except that his liability 
shall be satisfied only out of partnership property. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 17; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 256. 
ship §§ 914 to 919, 933. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 238. 
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48-1-15. Rules determining r ights and dut ies of pa r tne r s . 
The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be 
determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules: 
(1) Each partner shall be repaid his contributions, whether by way of 
capital or advances to the partnership property, and share equally in the 
••*
v
 profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to part-
ners, are satisfied; and must contribute towards the losses, whether of 
capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to his share 
in the profits. 
(2) The partnership must indemnify every partner in respect of pay-
ments made and personal liabilities reasonably incurred by him in the 
ordinary and proper conduct of its business, or for the preservation of its 
business or property. 
(3) A partner who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or 
advance beyond the amount of capital which he agreed to contribute shall 
be paid interest from the date of the payment or advance. 
(4) A partner shall receive interest on the capital contributed by him 
only from the date when repayment should be made. 
(5) All partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of 
the partnership business. 
(6) No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership 
business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable com-
pensation for his services in winding up the partnership affairs. 
(7) No person can become a member of a partnership without the con-
sent of all the partners. 
(8) Any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the 
partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners; but no 
act in contravention of any agreement between the partners may be done 
rightfully without the consent of all the partners. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 18; U.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 09-1-15. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS termine the means or methods of operating. 
Johanson Bros. Bldrs. v. Board of Review, 118 
Existence of partnership. Utah 384, 222 P.2d 563 (1950). 
Gifts to members of family. 
Remuneration to partner for services. Gifts to m e m b e r s of family. 
Repayment of contributions. Where father intended at the time of dissolu-
Sharing profits and losses. tion of family partnership to make a gift to his 
son and wife of certain amounts of the capital 
Exis tence of p a r t n e r s h i p . contributions he had made to the partnership, 
An organization of workers, formed for the
 a n d i n t e nded that such gift be accomplished by 
purpose of performing and undertaking con-
 e a c h p a r t n e r ' s sharing according to respective 
tracts for bricklaying jobs, did not have the es-
 p a r t n e r s h i p interests in the total assets of the 
sential elements of either a general or limited
 p a r t n e r s h i p including the contributions made 
partnership where all the equipment used by
 b y t h e f a t h e r a n d t h e o t h e r p a r t n e r s r e l i e d o n 
workers belonged to one individual who had
 s u c h g i f l t h e a g r e e m e n t between the parties 
sole authority to make contracts for himself
 s u p e r s e d e d Subsection (1) of this section. West 
and the organization, and where workers were
 v W e s t 1 6 U t a h 2 d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1965). 
not entitlod to share in profits equally or on 
any fixed percentage basis, were not charge- R e m u n e r a t i o n to p a r t n e r for serv ices . 
able for losses, and were not permitted to de- Where partners had made no agreement as 
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to the partners ' wages or compensation, it was 
not error for the trial court to exclude evidence 
tha t one partner did more work than the other, 
for par tners receive no compensation for action 
in the partnership business (other than split-
ting the profits) unless there is an agreement 
or provision for such remuneration. Keller v. 
Wixom, 123 Utah 103, 255 P.2d 118 (1953). 
Generally, a partner is not entitled to any 
remuneration for his services in the absence of 
an agreement by the partners to that effect. 
Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 371, 374 P.2d 
841 (1962). 
Where the partnership agreement or a spe-
cific practice, acquiesced in by the partners, 
contemplates the payment of salary to one or 
more partners , but no amounts are specified, it 
is presumed that payment of reasonable sala-
ries is intended. Chambers v. Sims, 13 Utah 2d 
371, 374 P.2d 841 (1962). 
While generally a partner is not entitled to 
any remuneration for his services while acting 
in the partnership business in the absence of a 
partnership agreement providing for such re-
muneration, such an agreement for remunera-
tion may be either expressed or implied. 
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981). 
In the absence of an agreement providing for 
remuneration, par tner was not entitled to re-
muneration for services rendered while acting 
in the partnership business. Nupetco Assocs. v. 
Jenkins, 669 P.2d 877 (Utah 1983). 
R e p a y m e n t of con t r i bu t i ons . 
Upon dissolution and distribution of partner-
ship assets, this section does not authorize the 
deduction of depreciation from advances made 
for capital improvements in repayment of the 
partners ' contributions, and trial court erred 
when it ordered such deduction for deprecia-
tion because the partnership agreement did 
not authorize such deduction and to allow the 
deduction would produce an unjust result. 
Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 (Utah 1981). 
S h a r i n g prof i ts a n d losses . 
Although obligation to share losses is not di-
rectly expressed in partnership agreement, 
generally agreement to share profits, nothing 
being said about losses, amounts prima facie to 
agreement to share losses also. Bentley v. 
Brossard, 33 Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908). 
In absence of agreement or proof of agree-
ment to contrary, partners will divide profits 
and losses equally. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 409 to 418, 469 to 475. 
C .J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76. 
A.L.R. — Partner 's breach of fiduciary duty 
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 70. 
48-1-16. Partnership books. 
The partnership books shall be kept, subject to any agreement between the 
partners, at the principal place of business of the partnership, and every 
partner shall at all times have access to and may inspect and copy any of 
them. 
His to ry : L. 1921, ch . 89, ft 19; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 962 to 967. 
C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 91. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 80. 
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48-1-17. Duty of partners to render information. 
Partners shall render on demand true and full information of all things 
affecting the partnership to any partner, or the legal representatives of any 
deceased partner, or partner under legal disability. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 20; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-17. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
P a r t n e r a c q u i r i n g o the r p a r t n e r ' s in teres t . ner managed and kept the financial records of 
Partner 's failure to disclose voluntarily to the primary partnership asset and had ample 
the other partner the value of the other part- access to information about the value of his 
ner's limited partnership interest before ac- interest. Burke v. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015 (Utah 
quiring such interest from him was not a 1982). 
breach of fiduciary duty where the other part-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
ship §§ 409 to 410, 425. another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 76. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 70. 
A.L.R. — Partner 's breach of fiduciary duty 
48-1-18. Partner accountable as a fiduciary. 
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as 
trustee for it any profits, derived by him without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liqui-
dation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property. 
This section applies also to the representatives of a deceased partner en-
gaged in the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership as the personal 
representatives of the last surviving partner. 
History: L. 1921, ch . 89, § 21; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-18. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS original adventurers for failing to inform them 
,
 v of employee's discovery until after he obtained 
Employees actions.
 o p t i o n L a n e v p e r s o n , 68 Utah 585, 251 P. 
Partnership income. 374 (1926) 
Relations inter se. 
Secret profits. P a r t n e r s h i p income . 
Cited. Where partnership was organized for pur-
c , , . pose of furnishing supplies to laborers em-
Employee s ac t ions . ,
 d b r a m J ,. h t a a n d o n e 
Where employee of one member of a group of
 t n e r w a s t o a c t a g t r e a s u r e r a n d f u r n i s h a „ 
joint adventurers seeking to buy and sell cer-
 f o r e j g n ] a b o r o n c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k > f o r w h i c h 
tain contiguous lands having valuable clay de-
 h e w a s t o r e c d v e i n f u H n t o n e . t h i r d o f 
posits discovers clay on other adjoining land,
 n e t fitg o f p a r t n e r s h i m r e c e i v e d (or 
obtains op ion thereon, and enters into a con-
 f u r n i s h i l a b o r w a s p a r t n e r s h i p income, 
tract with the group for a share of the proceeds
 p . y S k l i r i S ) 5 4 U t a h g 8 1 ? 9 p 7 3 Q ( m 9 ) 
and upon consideration of his option being 
turned over to the group, his employer is not Re la t ions in te r se. 
chargeable with breach of trust toward other The relation of partners between themselves 
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is fiduciary, that of trustee and cestui que 
trust , and this fiduciary relationship exists be-
tween surviving partner and legal representa-
tive of deceased partner. Sharp v. Sharp, 54 
Utah 262, 180 P. 580 (1919). 
Secre t profits. 
Member of partnership will not be permitted 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 420 to 426. 
C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 76, 378. 
A.L.R. — Partner's breach of fiduciary duty 
to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, ft 22; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-19. 
ANALYSIS 
Action for accounting. 
Estates of decedents. 
Statute of limitations. 
Action for accounting. 
Before one partner can compel another part-
ner to pay what is claimed to be indebtedness 
to partnership, it must be first ascertained that 
amount owed by debtor partner is greater 
amount than he would be entitled to receive 
upon str iking balance and finding interest of 
each partner in assets of partnership; ag-
grieved parties must bring action for account-
ing ra ther than action on claimed debt. 
Bankers ' Trust Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah 525, 190 
P. 1113 (1920). 
Estates of decedents. 
Administrator of deceased partner held enti-
tled to maintain an action against heirs of an-
other par tner for general accounting of part-
nership affairs, where it appeared that ac-
counting was necessary, coupled with addi-
tional fact that estate of other partner had 
been closed and personal representative re-
to take advantage of any secret agreement to 
receive private or personal gain for work or 
business carried on by partnership. Paggi v. 
Skliris, 54 Utah 88, 179 P. 739 (1919). 
Cited in Billings v. Cinnamon Ridge, Ltd. 
(In re Granada, Inc.), 92 Bankr. 501 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 1988). 
Civil liability of one partner to another or to 
the partnership based on partner 's personal 
purchase of partnership property during exis-
tence of partnership, 37 A.L.R.4th 494. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 81. 
leased from further duty in administration of 
estate. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Riter, 56 Utah 
525, 190 P. 1113 (1920). 
Where a deceased partner 's daughter, who 
acted as one of the personal representatives of 
her father's estate, had held the partnership 
assets in trust for the surviving partner and 
had control of her father's accounts and the 
records of those accounts before she died, the 
estate had the burden of (1) proving which ac-
counts were partnership accounts and which 
were not, (2) identifying the source of the funds 
contained in nonpartnership accounts if possi-
ble, and (3) proving that the funds which had 
been in partnership accounts and had been re-
moved from those accounts by the personal rep-
resentatives had been adequately accounted 
for. In re Estate of Harris, 728 P.2d 1003 (Utah 
1986). 
S t a tu t e of l imi ta t ions . 
In action against executors for accounting 
based on partnership between plaintiff and de-
ceased, evidence was insufficient to show that 
cause of action was barred by statute of limita-
tions so that court erred in nonsuiting plaintiff. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
48-1-19. Right to an account. 
Any partner shall have the right to a formal account as to partnership 
affairs: 
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the partnership business or pos-
session of its property by his copartners. 
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any agreement. 
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18. 
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it just and reasonable. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Kimball v. McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 
(1927). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J i i r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- mences to run on right of partnership account-
ship §§ 9G8 to 970. ing, 44 A.L.R.4th 678. 
C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 378, 379. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership <s=> 81. 
A.L.R. — When statute of limitations com-
48-1-20. Continuation of partnership beyond fixed term. 
When a partnership for a fixed term or particular undertaking is continued 
after the termination of such term or particular undertaking without any 
express agreement, the rights and duties of the partners remain the same as 
they were at such termination so far as is consistent with a partnership at 
will. 
A continuation of the business by the partners, or such of them as 
habitually acted therein during the term, without any settlement or liquida-
tion of the partnership affairs, is prima facie evidence of a continuation of the 
partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 23; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-20. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 64, 350. 
ship §§ 89 to 95. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership *= 60, 259. 
48-1-21. Extent of property rights of a partner. 
The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific partnership 
property, (2) his interest in the partnership and (3) his right to participate in 
the management. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 24; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-21. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 16, 85. 
ship § 383. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 76, 79. 
48-1-22. Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership 
property. 
( D A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property 
holding as a tenant in partnership. 
(2) The incidents of this tenancy are such that: 
(a) A partner, subject to the provisions of this chapter and to any agree-
ment between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to pos-
sess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no 
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right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent 
of his partners. 
(b) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable, 
except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in 
the same property. 
(c) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to 
attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership. 
When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt, the part-
ners, or any of them, or the representative of a deceased partner, cannot 
claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws. 
(d) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property 
vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was 
the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his 
legal representatives. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal 
representatives of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the 
partnership property for any but a partnership purpose. 
(e) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to 
dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs or next of kin. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 25; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-22. 
ANALYSIS 
Divorce settlement. 
Individual property. 
New tenancy. 
Right of marital distributive share. 
Divorce settlement. 
Neither a partner nor his ex-wife could force 
a sale of specific partnership property for pur-
poses of a property settlement pursuant to a 
divorce. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 
1981). 
Individual property. 
Evidence supported a finding that certain re-
alty was not partnership property, which 
would have made it exempt from a judgment 
lien, where the parties treated the land as the 
individual property of the partners and not as 
partnership property. Frandsen v. Holladay, 
739 P.2d 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
New tenancy. 
This section sets forth with particularity the 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 384, 401 to 404. 
C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 72, 73. 
A.L.R. — Embezzlement, larceny, false pre-
incidents of a new tenancy, that of a "tenant in 
partnership." In re Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 
47, 286 P.2d 796 (1955). 
Right of marital d i s t r i bu t ive s h a r e . 
Courts that have considered the changes 
brought about by the adoption of the Uniform 
B Partnership Act have concluded that the legis-
lative intention was to enact the English rule 
» and have, with the exception of one state, held 
1
 that marital rights in specific partnership 
property have been excluded by the act. In re 
Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796 
- (1955). 
l Through the Uniform Partnership Act the 
Legislature intended to adopt the English rule 
s of conversion of real property into personalty 
3
 when it is partnership property. Hence, as to 
» partnership real property, the wife of a partner 
would not have a marital interest. In re 
Ostler's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796 
i (1955). 
tenses, or allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82 
A.L.R.3d 822. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 68. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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48-1-23. Nature of partner's interest in the partnership. 
A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and sur-
plus, and the same is personal property. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 26; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-23. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- or medical partnership for purposes of division 
ship §§ 385 to 387. of property in divorce proceedings, 74 A.L.R.3d 
C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 85. 621. 
A.L.R. — Evaluation of interest in law firm Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=> 76. 
48-1-24. Assignment of partner's interest. 
A conveyance by a partner of his interest in the partnership does not of 
itself dissolve the partnership, or, as against the other partners in the absence 
of agreement, entitle the assignee during the continuance of the partnership 
to interfere in the management or administration of the partnership business 
or affairs, or to require any information or account of partnership transac-
tions, or to inspect the partnership books; but it merely entitles the assignee 
to receive in accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning 
partner would otherwise be entitled. 
In case of a dissolution of a partnership, the assignee is entitled to receive 
his assignor's interest, and may require an account from the date only of the 
last account agreed to by all the partners. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, $ 27; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-24. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ters' interests in partnership, written in terms 
^ , , . of present purchase and present determination Common-law mining partnership.
 f , . , ., , . r , . , mor . r L r • i L of value, but the purchase price of which was 
— Ciiieci oi assignment of interest. . , , .., , , •_. , , . . . 
Contract to transfer partnership interests. n ° ?***hX* UntlX d e ™ n d e d b ? v e n d o r s > d » d 
not freeze the price of the interests sold at the 
Common- law min ing p a r t n e r s h i p . time contract was made, where the purchase 
— Effect of a s s ignmen t of in teres t . P r i c e w a s not demanded until 1960 and the 
A principal distinction between ordinary business had grown in financial value with the 
trading partnership and mining partnership is benefit of vendors' continuing capital invest-
that member of mining partnership may as- ment, and where, over the years, losses on 
sign his interest without consent of his copart- sales and charitable deductions had been allo-
ners, and the assignment does not work disso- cated pro rata to the owners, including ven-
lution of partnership. Bentley v. Brossard, 33 dors, vendors were named co-owners on tax re-
Utah 396, 94 P. 736 (1908). turns, and $27,000 in accumulated profits be-
Con t r ac t to t r ans fe r p a r t n e r s h i p in te res t s . longing to vendors had been retained by the 
A 1932 contract between general partners partnership as working capital. Bullough v. 
and their brothers and sisters for sale of lat- Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 400 P.2d 20 (1965). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- to copartner on sale of partnership interest to 
ship §§ 833 to 837, 970. another partner, 4 A.L.R.4th 1122. 
C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 102, 103, Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 95, 226, 
244, 245. 227. 
A.L.R. — Partner 's breach of fiduciary duty 
48-1-25. Partner's interest subject to charging order. 
(1) On due application to a competent court by any judgment creditor of a 
partner the court which entered the judgment, order or decree, or any other 
court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with payment of the 
unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt with interest thereon and may then 
or later appoint a receiver of his share of the profits and of any other money 
due or to "fell due to him in respect of the partnership, and make aii other 
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the debtor partner might 
have made or which the circumstances of the case may require. 
(2) The interest charged may be redeemed at any time before foreclosure, 
or, in case of a sale being directed by the court, may be purchased without 
thereby causing a dissolution: 
(a) with separate property, by any one or more of the partners; or, 
(b) with partnership property, by any one or more of the partners with 
the consent of all the partners whose interests are not so charged or sold. 
(3) Nothing in this chapter shall be held to deprive a partner of his right, if 
any, under the exemption laws as regards his interest in the partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 9 28; R.S. 1933 & Cross-References . — Exemptions gener 
C. 1943, 69-1-25. ally, Title 78, Chapter 23. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 189 
ship §§ 790 to 795. Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 181. 
48-1-26. "Dissolution" defined. 
The dissolution of a partnership is the change in the relation of the partners 
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on, as distin-
guished from the winding up, of the business. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 5 29; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-26. 
Effect of dissolution. 
Dissolution does not, in itself, necessarily 
give either of the parties an immediate cause 
of action or suit against the other. Kimball v. 
McCornick, 70 Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 331. 
ship §§ 808 to 810. Key Numbers. — Partnership *=» 261. 
48-1-27. Pa r tne r sh ip not terminated by dissolution. 
On dissolution a partnership is not terminated, but continues until the 
winding up of partnership affairs is completed. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 30; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-27. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS have been paid for by the partnership. 
Pantages v. Arge, 1 Utah 2d 105, 262 P.2d 745 
In general. (1953). 
C i t e d
 A partnership at will was not terminated 
In general w h e n o n e P a r t n e r notified the other he was 
Where a partner's conduct constituted acts of f.nd'h"R . t h e P " 4 ™ ^ * ' " « » «P«U«| M">.from 
dissolution, the partnership was not thus ter- ? M £ 7 ^ 9 5 7 ) ™ V' 
minated and its affairs had to be wound up. 
The services of an accountant in preparing an Cited in McCune & McCune v. Mountain 
account of the partnership's business should Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914 (Utah 1988). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 351. 
ship § 889. Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 277. 
48-1-28. Causes of dissolution. 
Dissolution is caused: 
(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners: 
(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertak-
ing specified in the agreement. 
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or 
particular undertaking is specified. 
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned 
their interests, or suffered them to be charged for their separate 
debts, either before or after the termination of any specified term or 
particular undertaking. 
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in 
accordance with such a power conferred by the agreement between 
the partners. 
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the 
circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of 
this section, by the express will of any partner at any time. 
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the part-
nership to be carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership. 
(4) By the death of any partner. 
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership. 
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(6) By decree of court under Section 48-1-29. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, J 31; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-28. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Remedy for expulsion of one partner by 
,_ . . , . another. 
^ D e X X a r t n e ? * P a r t n e r 8 h , P ' Where, under a partnership at will, one part-
Remedy for expulsion of one partner by an- ™r fraudulently expelled another partner from 
0( ;n e r the partnership, the remedy was an accounting 
of the partnership profits, based upon an as-Common-Iaw mining partnership. sumption of a continued partnership with full 
—Death of partner. participation in profits according to the part-
An important distinction between an ordi-
 n e r g h i p agreement, at least for the period from 
nary trading partnership and a mining part-
 t h e w r o n ^ u l expulsion to actual dissolution by 
nership is that the death of a member of a mm-
 c i r c u m g t a n c e 8 o r d e c r e e o f c o u r t G r a h a m v. 
S! £££&. ^ rlZSS^t* *•*2 utah 2d 144> 2 7 ° p 2d 456 < 1 9 5 4 ) 
396, 94 P. 736 (1908). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 259V2 to 
ship §§ 815 to 871. 276. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 330 to 
349. 
48-1-29. Dissolution by decree of court . 
(1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a dissolution 
whenever: 
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or 
is shown to be of unsound mind. 
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his 
part of the partnership contract. 
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudi-
cially the carrying on of the business. 
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the partner-
ship agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to 
the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on 
the business in partnership with him. 
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss. 
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable. 
(2) On the application of the purchaser of a partner's interest under Section 
48-1-24 or 48-1-25: 
(a) After the termination of the specified term or particular undertak-
ing. 
(b) At any time, if the partnership was a partnership at will, when the 
interest was assigned or when the charging order was issued. 
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 32; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-29. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Accounting. 
Judgment, order or decree. 
Jurisdiction. 
Not reasonably practicable. 
Accounting. 
In a suit for the dissolution of a partnership 
the trial court has discretion to order an ac-
counting Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 
145 P 2 d 780 (1944). 
J u d g m e n t , o r d e r or d ec r ee . 
Although judgment ordering dissolution of a 
partnership was void because there was no evi-
dence of a partnership as alleged by plaintiff, 
such judgment was final judgment from which 
appeal could be taken Benson v Rozzelle, 85 
Utah 582, 39 P 2d 1113 (1934) 
Jurisdiction. 
Where there was no evidence of a three-
party partnership as alleged By plaintiff in ac-
tion for dissolution of partnership, court was 
without jurisdiction to order dissolution, since 
no partnership existed. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 
Utah 582, 39 P.2d 1113 (1934). 
Not reasonably practicable. 
Partner 's conduct, in keeping the books and 
records contrary to agreement and using part-
nership funds for private purposes, regardless 
of his intent, provided more than ample sup-
port for the conclusion that it was no longer 
reasonably practicable or equitable for parties 
to continue their partnership business, render-
ing dissolution appropriate. Crowther v. Car-
ter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —- 59A Am Jur . 2d Partner- at profit as justification for court-ordered disso-
ship §§ 847 to 871. lution, 20 A.L.R.4th 122. 
C.J .S. — 68 C J.S. Partnership §§ 338, 339, Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 267, 273, 
349 274. 
A.L.R. — Inability of partnership to operate 
48-1-30. General effect of dissolution on authority of part-
ner. 
Except so far as may be necessary to wind up partnership affairs or to 
complete transactions begun but not then finished, dissolution terminates all 
authority of any partner to act for the partnership. 
(1) With respect to the partners: 
(a) when the dissolution is not by the act, bankruptcy or death of a 
partner; or, 
(b) when the dissolution is by such act, bankruptcy or death of a 
partner in cases where Section 48-1-31 so requires. 
(2) With respect to persons not partners as declared in Section 48-1-32. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 33; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-30. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner 
ship §§ 934 to 944. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354 to C.J.S. 
362. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership <s= 278. 
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48-1-31. Right of partner to contribution from copartners 
after dissolution. 
Where the dissolution is caused by the act, death or bankruptcy of a partner 
each partner is liable to his copartners for his share of any liability created by 
any partner acting for the partnership as if the partnership had not been 
dissolved unless: 
(1) The dissolution being by act of any partner, the partner acting for 
the partnership had knowledge of the dissolution, or, 
(2) The dissolution being by the death or bankruptcy of a partner, the 
partner acting for the partnership had knowledge or notice of the death or 
bankruptcy. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 34; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-31. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 359 
ship § 935. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership <s=> 283 
48-1-32. Power of partner to bind partnership to third per-
sons after dissolution. 
(1) After dissolution a partner can bind the partnership, except as provided 
in paragraph (3): 
(a) By any act appropriate for winding up partnership affairs or com-
pleting transactions unfinished at dissolution. 
(b) By any transaction which would bind the partnership, if dissolution 
had not taken place, provided the other party to the transaction: 
1st Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and 
had no knowledge or notice of the dissolution; or, 
2nd Though he had not so extended credit, had nevertheless known 
of the partnership prior to dissolution, and, having no knowledge or 
notice of dissolution, the fact of dissolution had not been advertised in 
a newspaper of general circulation in the place (or in each place, if 
more than one) at which the partnership business was regularly car-
ried on. 
(2) The liability of a partner under paragraph (1Kb) shall be satisfied out of 
partnership assets alone when such partner had been prior to dissolution: 
(a) unknown as a partner to the person with whom the contract is 
made; and, 
(b) so far unknown and inactive in partnership affairs that the busi-
ness reputation of the partnership could not be said to have been in any 
degree due to his connection with it. 
(3) The partnership is in no case bound by any act of a partner after dissolu-
tion: 
(a) where the partnership is dissolved because it is unlawful to carry on 
the business, unless the act is appropriate for winding up partnership 
affairs; or, 
(b) where the partner has become bankrupt; or, 31 
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(c) where the partner has no authority to wind up partnership affairs; 
except by a transaction with one who: 
1st Had extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution and 
had no knowledge or notice of his want of authority; or, 
2nd Had not extended credit to the partnership prior to dissolution, 
and, having no knowledge or notice of his want of authority, the fact 
of his want of authority has not been advertised in the manner pro-
vided for advertising the fact of dissolution in paragraph (1Kb) 2nd. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect the liability under Section 48-1-13 of 
any person who after dissolution represents himself or consents to another's 
representing him as a partner in a partnership engaged in carrying on busi-
ness. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 35; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-32. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354 to 
ship §§ 936 to 961. 362. 
Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «=» 278, 279. 
48-1-33. Effect of dissolution on partner's existing liabil-
ity. 
(1) The dissolution of a partnership does not of itself discharge the existing 
liability of any partner. 
(2) A partner is discharged for any existing liability upon dissolution of the 
partnership by an agreement to that effect between himself, the partnership 
creditor and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such 
agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor 
having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing 
the business. 
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved 
partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be dis-
charged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of 
the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of 
payment of such obligations. 
(4) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for all 
obligations of the partnership incurred while he was a partner, but subject to 
the prior payment of his separate debts. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 36; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-33. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Agreement by third person to assume obli- partnership was to pay him the money owing 
gations required. to the dissolving partnership, but the pur-
Under this s ta tute there must be an assump- chaser had never assumed the liabilities of the 
tion of liability by a third person of the part- partnership, the creditor could obtain judg-
nership obligation if the partners are to be dis-
 m e n t against the dissolving partnership when 
charged of their liabilities. Thus where a credi-
 t n e p u r c h a s e r failed to pay him Davis v. 
tor of a dissolving partnership consented to an Kemp, 3 Utah 2d 16, 277 P.2d 816 (1951). 
arrangement whereby the purchaser of the 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- operated under tradename for supplies fur-
ship §§ 906 to 913. nished to successor by one without notice of 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 352. transfer, 70 A.L.R.3d 1250. 
A.L.R. — Liability of transferor of business Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 277, 279. 
48-1-34. Right to wind up. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the partners who have not wrongfully dissolved 
the partnership or the legal representatives of the last surviving partner, not 
bankrupt, has the right to wind up the partnership affairs; provided, however, 
that any partner, his legal representatives or his assignee upon cause shown 
may obtain a winding up by the court. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 8 37; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-34. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 273, 355 
ship §§ 1100, 1180. Key N u m b e r s . — Partnership «= 244 
48-1-35. Rights of partners to application of partnership 
property. 
(1) When dissolution is caused in any way, except in contravention of the 
partnership agreement, each partner, as against his copartners and all per-
sons claiming through them in respect of their interests in the partnership, 
unless otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to dis-
charge its liabilities, and the surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount 
owing to the respective partners. But if dissolution is caused by expulsion of a 
partner, bona fide under the partnership agreement, and if the expelled part-
ner is discharged from all partnership liabilities either by payment or agree-
ment under Section 48-1-33(2), he shall receive in cash only the net amount 
due him from the partnership. 
(2) When dissolution is caused in contravention of the partnership agree-
ment the rights of the partners shall be as follows: 
(a) Each partner who has not caused dissolution wrongfully shall have: 
1st All the rights specified in paragraph (1) of this section; and, 
2nd The right as against each partner who has caused the dissolu-
tion wrongfully to damages for breach of the agreement. 
(b) The partners who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully, if 
they all desire to continue the business in the same name, either by 
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themselves or jointly with others, may do so during the agreed term for 
the partnership, and for that purpose may possess the partnership prop-
erty; provided, they pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution 
wrongfully the value of his interest in the partnership at the dissolution, 
less any damages recoverable under clause (2)(a) 2nd of this section or 
secure the payment by bond approved by the court, and in like manner 
indemnify him against all present or future partnership liabilities. 
(c) A partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully shall have: 
1st If the business is not continued under the provisions of para-
graph (2Mb), all the rights of a partner under paragraph (1), subject to 
clause (2)(a) 2nd of this section. 
2nd If the business is continued under paragraph (2)(b) of this 
section, the right as against his copartners, and all claiming through 
them, in respect of their interests in the partnership, to have the 
value of his interest in the partnership, less any damages caused to 
his copartners by the dissolution, ascertained and paid to him in 
cash, or the payment secured by bond approved by the court, and to 
be released from all existing liabilities of the partnership; but in 
ascertaining the value of the partner's interest the value of the good 
will of the business shall not be considered. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 38; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-35. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cont inua t ion of bus iness . ner took over the business permanently and he 
Where one partner was forced to take over could not be charged with all the business obli-
the operation of a cafe to save it from further gations. Eardley v. Sammons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 
losses due to the other partner's neglect, evi- 330 P.2d 122 (1958). 
dence did not support a finding that the part-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 354, 386. 
ship §§ 1211 to 1219. Key Numbers. — Partnership «= 277, 297. 
48-1-36. Rights where partnership is dissolved for fraud 
or misrepresentation. 
Where a partnership contract is rescinded on the ground of the fraud or 
misrepresentation of one of the parties thereto, the party entitled to rescind is, 
without prejudice to any other right, entitled: 
(1) to a lien on, or right of retention of, the surplus of the partnership 
property, after satisfying the partnership liabilities to third persons, for 
any sum of money paid by him for the purchase of an interest in the 
partnership and for any capital or advances contributed by him; and, 
(2) to stand, after all liabilities to third persons have been satisfied, in 
the place of the creditors of the partnership for any payments made by 
him in respect of the partnership liabilities; and, 
(3) to be indemnified by the person guilty of the fraud or making the 
representation against all debts and liabilities of the partnership. 
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 39; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-36. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner- C.J .S . — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 13. 
ship §§ 871, 903 to 905. Key Numbers. — Partnership «=» 25. 
48-1-37, Rules for distribution. 
In settling accounts between the partners after dissolution the following 
rules shall be observed, subject to any agreement to the contrary: 
(1) The assets of the partnership are: 
(a) The partnership property. 
(b) The contributions of the partners necessary for the payment of 
all the liabilities specified in Subdivision (2) of this section 
(2) The liabilities of the partnership shall rank in order of payment, as 
follows: 
(a) Those owing to creditors other than partners. 
(b) Those owing to partners other than for capital and profits. 
(c) Those owing to partners in respect of capital. 
(d) Those owing to partners in respect of profits. 
(3) The assets shall be applied in the order of their declaration in Sub-
section (1) of this section to the satisfaction of the liabilities. 
(4) The partners shall contribute as provided by Section 48-1-15(1) the 
amount necessary to satisfy the liabilities; but if any, but not all, of the 
partners are insolvent, or, not being subject to process, refuse to contrib-
ute, the other partners shall contribute their share of the liabilities, and 
in the relative proportions in which they share the profits the additional 
amount necessary to pay the liabilities. 
(5) An assignee for the benefit of creditors, or any person appointed by 
the court, shall have the right to enforce the contributions specified in 
Subsection (4) of this section. 
(6) Any partner or his legal representative shall have the right to en-
force the contributions specified in Subsection (4) of this section to the 
extent of the amount which he has paid in excess of his share of the 
liability. 
(7) The individual property of a deceased partner shall be liable for the 
contributions specified in Subsection (4) of this section. 
(8) When partnership property and the individual properties of the 
partners are in the possession of a court for distribution, partnership 
creditors shall have priority on partnership property and separate credi-
tors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors 
as heretofore. 
(9) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent, the 
claims against his separate property shall rank in the following order: 
(a) Those owing to separate creditors. 
(b) Those owing to partnership creditors. 
(c) Those owing to partners by way of contribution. 
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History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 40; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-37. 
NOTES T( 
ANALYSIS 
Collection on partnership judgment. 
Credits. 
Goodwill. 
Money in bank. 
Money invested. 
Partnership receipts. 
Repayment of contributions. 
Collection on p a r t n e r s h i p judgment. 
Where partners conducted business without 
books and took money from partnership for liv-
ing expenses, partner could not be charged 
with money collected on a partnership judg-
ment on dissolution of partnership, in absence 
of evidence that it was appropriated to his own 
use for other than living expenses. Buzianis v. 
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932). 
Credi ts . 
Where contribution of one partner exceeded 
that of other partner and he borrowed money 
from his wife for purpose of purchasing prop-
erty for partnership, on dissolution he was en-
titled to credit for such excess and for money 
borrowed, together with interest until date of 
termination of partnership. Buzianis v. 
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932). 
Goodwil l . 
A partnership of certified public accountants 
is of the same nalure as a partnership of attor-
neys or physicians and has no goodwill to be 
accounted for as an asset upon dissolution in 
absence of provision in partnership agreement 
relating to goodwill. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 
Utah 2d 81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966). 
Where goodwill was not carried as an asset 
on partnership books and partnership agree-
ment did not contemplate that goodwill be in-
cluded in book value of partnership, it was 
COLLATERAL 
Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
ship §§ 1200 to 1222. 
DECISIONS 
proper to exclude goodwill as an item requiring 
an accounting by one partner to another upon 
dissolution. Jackson v. Caldwell, 18 Utah 2d 
81, 415 P.2d 667 (1966). 
Money in bank. 
In determining rights of partners upon disso-
lution of partnership, it was held that money 
in the bank, which receiver had taken charge 
of, was improperly included in the computation 
of total receipts. Wardrop v. Harrison, 63 Utah 
132, 222 P. 1069 (1924). 
Money invested. 
Where evidence supported finding that part-
ner used partnership funds to purchase Greek 
currency, he was properly charged with such 
money on dissolution, together with interest to 
date of termination of partnership. Buzianis v. 
Buzianis, 81 Utah 1, 16 P.2d 413 (1932). 
P a r t n e r s h i p rece ip ts . 
Under contract dissolving partnership en-
gaged in obtaining refunds of excessive freight 
rates paid to railroads, partner leaving part-
nership held entitled to percentage of fee in 
case that was pending at time of dissolution, 
although refund obtained was on freight bills 
paid after partnership was dissolved. Gallacher 
v. Foubert, 85 Utah 13, 38 P.2d 297 (1934). 
Repayment of contributions. 
Upon dissolution and distribution of the 
partnership assets, this section does not autho-
rize the deduction of depreciation from ad-
vances made for capital improvements in re-
payment of the partner's contributions, and 
trial court erred when it ordered such deduc-
tion for depreciation because the partnership 
agreement did not authorize such deduction 
and to allow the deduction would produce an 
unjust result. Knutson v. Lauer, 627 P.2d 66 
(Utah 1981). 
REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 385. 
Key Numbers. — Partnership «=> 300. 
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48-1-38. Liability of persons continuing the business in 
certain cases. 
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or 
when any partner retires and assigns (or the representatives of a deceased 
partner assign) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the part-
ners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons, if the 
business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors 
of the first, or dissolved, partnership are also creditors of the partnership so 
continuing the business. 
(2) When all but one partner retire and assign (or the representatives of a 
deceased partner assign) their rights in partnership property to the remaining 
partner, who continues the business without liquidation of partnership affairs 
either alone or with others, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also 
creditors of the person or partnership so continuing the business. 
(3) When any partner retires or dies and the business of the dissolved part-
nership is continued, as set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, with 
the consent of the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased part 
ner, but without any assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of 
creditors of the dissolved partnership and of creditors of the person or partner-
ship continuing the business shall be as if such assignment had been made. 
(4) When all the partners or their representatives assign their rights in 
partnership property to one or more third persons who promise to pay the 
debts and who continue the business of the dissolved partnership, creditors of 
the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or partnership con-
tinuing the business. 
(5) When any partner wrongfully causes a dissolution and the remaining 
partners continue the business under the provisions of Section 48-l-35(2)(b), 
either alone or with others and without liquidation of the partnership affairs, 
creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person or part-
nership continuing the business. 
(6) When a partner is expelled and the remaining partners continue the 
business, either alone or with others, without liquidation of the partnership 
affairs, creditors of the dissolved partnership are also creditors of the person 
or partnership continuing the business. 
(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the partnership 
continuing the business under this section, to the creditors of the dissolved 
partnership shall be satisfied out of partnership property only. 
(8) When the business of a partnership after dissolution is continued under 
any conditions set forth in this section, the creditors of the dissolved partner-
ship, as against the separate creditors of the retiring or deceased partner or 
the representatives of the deceased partner, have a prior right to any claim of 
the retired partner or the representatives of the deceased partner against the 
person or partnership continuing the business on account of the retired or 
deceased partner's interest in the dissolved partnership, or on account of any 
consideration promised for such interest, or for his right in partnership prop-
erty. 
(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to modify any right of creditors to 
set aside any assignment on the ground of fraud. 
(10) The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the 
partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall not 
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of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for any 
debts contracted by such person or partnership. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 41; U.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-38. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's Am. J u r . 2d. — 59A Am. Jur . 2d Partner-
Business Name Statutes: "An Open Invitation ship §§ 913 to 919. 1131 to 1133. 
to Litigation," 1983 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 795. C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 255. 
Key Numbers . — Partnership e=» 237. 
48-1-39. Rights of retiring or estate of deceased par tner 
when the business is continued. 
When any partner retires or dies and the business is continued under any of 
the conditions set forth in Section 48-1-38(1), (2), (3), (5), (6), or Section 
48-l-35(2)(b) without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate 
and the person or partnership continuing the business, unless otherwise 
agreed, he or his legal representatives as against such persons or partnership 
may have the value of his interest at the date of dissolution ascertained, and 
shall receive as an ordinary creditor an amount equal to the value of his 
interest in the dissolved partnership with interest, or, at his option or at the 
option of his legal representatives, in lieu of interest, the profits attributable 
to the use of his right in the property of the dissolved partnership; provided, 
that the creditors of the dissolved partnership as against the separate credi-
tors or the representative of the retired or deceased partner shall have priority 
on any claim arising under this section, as provided by Section 48-1-38(8). 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 42; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-39. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Right of wife's d is t r ibut ive sha re . 
Courts that have considered the changes 
Applicability. brought about by the adoption of the Uniform 
Right of wife's distributive share. Partnership Act have concluded that the legis-
AnDli bilitv lative intention was to enact the English ruie 
Application of this section was required for aLnd h a v e ' w i , t h t h e exception of one state, held 
settling dissolved partnership accounts be- t h a t m a r L i t a l ^ h t s , n s P e c i f i c Partnership 
tween widow of partner and successors of other P r o P e r t y h a v e b e en excluded by the act. In re 
partner. Wanlass v. D Land Title, 790 P.2d 568 °stler 's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 47, 286 P.2d 796 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). (1955). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner- C.J.S. - 68 C.J.S. Partnership §§ 251, 297. 
ship §§ 907, 908, 1133. Key Numbers . — Partnership «=» 232. 
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The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner or his 
legal representative as against the winding-up partners or the surviving part-
ners or the person or partnership continuing the business, at the date of 
dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
48-1-40. Accrual of actions. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 43; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-40. 
ANALYSIS 
Existence of partnership. 
Laches. 
Existence of par tnersh ip . 
In action for accounting against executors of 
estate of deceased, there was substantial evi-
dence of existence of partnership between 
plaintiff and deceased so that court erred in 
nonsuiting plaintiff. Kimball v. McCornick, 70 
Utah 189, 259 P. 313 (1927). 
Laches. 
In action by administrator of wife for part-
nership accounting with respect to personal 
property, wherein it appeared that for period of 
37 years after personal property came into 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partner-
ship §§ 968 to 970, 1175, 1176, 1045 to 1060. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 378. 
A.L.R. — When statute of limitations com-
48-2-1 to 48-2-27. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1990, ch. 233, § 71 repeals 
§§ 48-2-1 to 48-2-12, Utah Code Annotated 
1953; § 48-2-13, as amended by Laws 1975, ch. 
139, § 1; and §§ 48-2-14 to 48-2-27, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; all relating to limited part-
hands of husband on death of wife, no claim or 
demand whatever was made by interested par-
ties for its recovery or for an accounting with 
respect thereto, held that wife's administrator 
was barred by laches from maintaining this 
suit. Walton v. Broadhead, 54 Utah 320, 180 P. 
433 (1919). 
Delay of several years between partner's 
death and action for an accounting did not re-
quire application of laches because relation-
ship between surviving partner and deceased 
partner's son, who was carrying on business, 
was a confidential one, surviving partner did 
not know about disputed payments, and delay 
did not prejudice defendants. Bankers' Trust 
Co. v. Riter, 60 Utah 1, 206 P. 276 (1922). 
mences to run on right of partnership account-
ing, 44 A.L.R 1th 678. 
Key Numbers . — Partnership <r= 298. 
nerships, effective April 23, 1990. For present 
comparable provisions, see Chapter 2a of this 
title. See also § 48-2a-1104 as to applicability 
of former law, and § 48-2a-1106 (savings 
clause). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CHAPTER 2 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
(Repealed by Laws 1990, ch. 233, § 71.) 
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FILED DISTRICT M U S T 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 3 1 1990 
JOYCE MAUGHAN - 3833 
Attorney for Defendant/ 
Counter Claimants Peter Van 
Alstyne, Gerald Robinson 
and Jud i th Erickson 
455 South 300 East 
Suite 355 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
(801)359-5900 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARK 0. WALSH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs . ] 
JUDITH ERICKSON a/k/a JUDE ] 
ERICKSON; PETER VAN ALSTYNE, 
and GERALD ROBINSON, ] 
Defendants . ] 
1 FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
1 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C 86 -7199 
I Judge Moffat 
THIS MATTER came on for t r ia l before the Honorable Judge Richard H. 
Moffat on April 24 and 25, 1989. Plaintiff was present and represen ted by his 
a t to rney Steven D. Crawley and John Walsh. Defendants Jud i t h Erickson a/k/a 
Jude Erickson, Peter Van Alstyne, and Gerald Robinson were p re sen t and 
represented by the i r a t to rney Joyce Maughan. The Court hav ing heard testimony 
of the wi tnesses and having reviewed the exhibi ts entered on file herein, now 
therefore, the Court en ters i t s 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In December, 1984, plaintiff Mark Walsh (here inaf ter "Walsh") entered 
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into an oral Partnership agreement with Van Alstyne and Robinson, creating the 
Universal Video Partnership (hereinafter the "Partnership"). 
2. Terms of the Partnership agreement included the following: 
a. Robinson's obligations: Robinson agreed to and did loan $30,000.00 
to the Partnership for the purpose of paying a $25,000.00 payment on the Jet Star 
Contract and $5,000.00 for operating expenses. Robinson obtained the $30,000.00 
by taking out a second mortgage on his home, at the bank's interest rate of 
16.41% per annum. 
b. Walsh's and Van Alstyne's obligations: 
(1) Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to repay Robinson the full 
$30,000.00 plus interest at 19.41% per annum (3% plus the 16.41% rate Robinson 
was paying to his bank for the mortgage he took out to loan the $30,000.00 to 
start up the Universal Video Partnership. If the Universal Video business profits 
were not sufficient to repay Robinson, Walsh and Van Alstyne would personally 
repay Robinson. 
(2) Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to contribute time and labor to 
manage and run the business so as to satisfy the Partnership obligations and make 
a profit for the three partners. Robinson was a "silent partner" with no 
obligation to manage the business or pay its debts. 
(3) Walsh and Van Alstyne cosigned with each other to be 
obligated on the following contractual obligations: 
(a) Jet Star contract dated December 8, 1984 (hereinafter 
"Jet Star Contract"), pursuant to which Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed to be liable 
for purchasing from Jet Star Industries the business known as Universal Video 
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located at 5444 South 900 East, Murray, Utah. 
(b) Consent to Assignment of lease of the premises, 
executed by Walsh and Van Alstyne December 21, 1984, pursuant to which Walsh 
and Van Alstyne agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the tenants' 
obligations under the Oakwood Village Partnership lease (hereinafter "Oakwood 
Lease") dated March 11, 1982. This obligated Van Alstyne and Walsh to an 
eighteen-month lease term, from December, 1984 through June, 1985, at monthly 
lease payments of $1,420.00 to $1,440.00. 
(c) Application for Credit and personal guarantee to Oscar 
E. Chytraus Company (hereinafter, "Chytraus"), vendor of video tapes for the 
Universal Video Business, dated January 29, 1985, pursuant to which Walsh and 
Van Alstyne agreed to personally guarantee and be jointly and severally liable for 
Universal Video debts to Chytraus. 
(4) When they signed as obligors on the Jet Star Contract, the 
Oakwood lease, neither Walsh nor Van Alstyne asked Robinson to be responsible 
for satisfaction of the obligations on those contracts or any other of the 
Universal Video business debts. 
c. Rights to profits of the Universal Video Business: Walsh, Van 
Alstyne, and Robinson all agreed to share net profits equally after debts to 
Robinson and third parties had been paid. However, the debts exceeded the 
profits so there were no profits to distribute. 
3. Walsh had induced Van Alstyne to enter into the Partnership business by 
Walsh's representations of his previous experience and self-professed success in 
the video retail business. 
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4. When Van Alstyne entered into the Jet Star contract, the Oakwood 
Lease, and the Chytraus obligations with Walsh, Van Alstyne did so in reliance on 
Walsh' financial statement in December, 1984, which financial statement showed 
Walsh's net worth to be approximately $243,500.00 
5. Robinson is related to Van Alstyne by marriage. Van Alstyne negotiated 
with Robinson for the $30,000.00 loan to start up the Universal Video business. 
Van Alstyne told Walsh he did not want to have Robinson loan the $30,000.00 
without assurance that Robinson would be completely repaid. Walsh assured Van 
Alstyne that the Universal Video business revenue would repay Robinson, but that 
even if it did not, Walsh would mortgage his home if necessary to repay 
Robinson. In reliance on those assertions by Walsh, Van Alstyne assured Robinson 
that the $30,000.00 loan would be a safe investment and the debt to Robinson 
would be completely repaid. 
6. In reliance on those representations and on the fact that Walsh was a 
Bishop in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Robinson loaned Walsh 
and Van Alstyne the $30,000.00 to start up the Universal Video business. 
7. During the first three months of operation under Walsh and Van Alstyne, 
the Universal Video business generated barely enough income to pay its monthly 
obligations. 
8. During those first three months of operation, Walsh was concerned that 
the business revenue would not be sufficient to cover payments on the Oakwood 
lease (approximately $1,500.00 per month), the debt service on the Jet Star 
Contract, and the other business debts. 
9. Walsh had been concerned about that debt service since before entering 
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into the Jet Star Contract in December, 1984, and before getting the $30,000.00 
from Robinson. 
10. Walsh did not tell Van Alstyne of this concern until January, 1985, after 
Robinson had already loaned the $30,000,000, and after Walsh and Van Alstyne had 
cosigned on the Jet Star Contract, the Oakwood Lease, and the personal 
guarantee to Chytraus. 
11. Van Alstyne's decision to cosign on those three contracts (Jet Star, 
Oakwood, and Chytraus) with Walsh, and his decision to let Robinson loan 
$30,000.00 to the business, were decisions he made in reliance on Walsh's 
representations to Van Alstyne of Walsh's financial success in his previous video 
store and Walsh's assertions to Van Alstyne that the Universal Vide (Jet Star 
Contract) business would be a profitable venture, and that the Universal Vide 
Business revenue would certainly cover the obligations on the Jet Star Contract, 
the Oakwood lease, the Chytraus contract, and the repayment of $30,000.00 plus 
interest to Robinson. 
12. From January 1985 on, Walsh remained concerned that the business 
revenue couldn't cover the obligations to Jetstar, Oakwood, Chytraus, and 
Robinson. 
13. Walsh knew that the nature of video retail business is a seasonal 
business such that the most lucrative months are the winter months, and that 
income drops in the summer. 
14. In March, 1985, Walsh suggested to Van Alstyne that they put the 
business up for sale. 
15. Walsh had to leave town for a few days, so Van Alstyne agreed to place 
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a newspaper ad to sell the business. 
16. Van Alstyne placed the ad for a few days in a Salt Lake City local 
newspaper. The responses to the ad were discouraging. 
17. Van Alstyne discontinued the ad because of the expense of the ad and 
the poor responses to the ad. 
18. In March, 1985, Walsh told Van Alstyne that Walsh's personal financial 
situation was very poor and that he was facing bankruptcy and that, therefore, he 
had no assets to pay his obligations on the Universal Video obligations should the 
Universal Video business revenue be insufficient to pay those debts. 
19. Van Alstyne was shocked and deeply concerned by this confession of 
Walsh's purported financial troubles. 
20. In April, 1985, Walsh and Van Alstyne had an altercation because Van 
Alstyne had signed Walsh's name to several business checks to pay business debts. 
21. Walsh had told Van Alstyne not to pay those certain business debts 
because of the Universal Video cash flow dearth. Van Alstyne disagreed, and 
signed Walsh's name to the checks because Walsh had refused to do so. 
22. Shortly after the altercation described in the previous paragraph, Walsh 
acquiesced and approved of Van Alstyne's having paid the debts with Universal 
Video revenues. 
23. In the Jet Star Contract negotiations, Van Alstyne had negotiated for a 
discount provision pursuant to which Van Alstyne and Walsh would receive a 
discount if they could pay the contract balance to the sellers by June, 1985. 
24. With the newfound information of Walsh's personal financial distress, 
Van Alstyne hoped to find a new investor to help pay the approximately 
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$35,000.00 payoff in June, 1985 to Jet Star and to Contribute additional monies 
for the business. 
25. Defendant Judith Erickson (hereinafter "Erickson") was a clerk in the 
Universal Video store who had expressed interest in "buying into the store". 
26. Van Alstyne and Erickson discussed the possibility of her becoming an 
additional "partner" in the business if she could contribute at least $20,000.00 to 
the business. 
27. Van Alstyne told her she had to provide the $20,000.00 no later than 
May 31, 1985. She failed to do so by May 31, 1985 or thereafter. 
28. Separate from Van Alstyne's negotiations with Erickson, Walsh 
negotiated with Erickson to sell her his Partnership interest for $10,000.00. 
29. Erickson telephoned Van Alstyne to inform him she intended to 
purchase Walsh's interest for $10,000.00 
30. Van Alstyne and others, including Erickson's legal counsel at the time, 
told Erickson that $10,000.00 was far too much to pay Walsh. 
31. When Erickson told Walsh that Van Alstyne had told Erickson that 
$10,000 was too high a price, Walsh reassured Erickson that $10,000.00 was a fair 
price and told her that if she didn't agree to pay him the $10,000.00, Van Alstyne 
would pay Walsh more than $10,000.00 to purchase Walsh's Partnership interest. 
32. Because of Walsh's experience in the video business and because Walsh 
treated her such that she trusted him and believed he was looking out for her 
best interest, Erickson believed Walsh over Van Alstyne and the lawyer who was 
representing her at the time. 
33. On or about May 2, 1985, Erickson and Walsh signed the Sales 
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Agreement and Promissory Note and the Assignment and Assumption Agreement/ 
Consent to Assignment those being the documents purporting to sell Erickson all 
of Walsh's Partnership rights and obligations. 
34. The Sales documents in which Walsh purportedly sold his interest in the 
business to Erickson were prepare by the attorney who was representing Walsh at 
the time. 
35. Neither Walsh nor Erickson showed Van Alstyne or Robinson the Sales 
Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption Agreement, or Consent 
to Assignment. The first time Van Alstyne or Robinson saw those documents was 
in the fall of 1986 when served with Summons and Complaint in this action. 
However, Walsh had indicated to Erickson that Van Alstyne had approved of the 
documents (Sales Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption 
Agreement, and Consent to Assignment) before May 2, 1985, the date she signed 
the documents. 
36. Walsh received $5,500.00 from defendant Erickson toward the $10,000.00 
sum, paid as follows: $3,000.00 paid by Erickson May 2, 1985 and $500.00 for 
each of the five following months (June through October, 1985). 
37. After paying the October, 1985 $500.00 installment to Walsh, Erickson 
ceased paying Walsh. 
38. The reason Erickson cased paying Walsh in October, 1985 is that the 
attorney who was representing her at the time told her to stop paying on the 
Walsh contract because she was not getting anything for her payments. 
39. The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement speaks for itself but includes the 
following terms: 
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a. Walsh purportedly sold his Partnership rights and Partnership 
interest to Erickson; 
b. Erickson purportedly assumed Walsh's Partnership obligations 
including the following: Jet Star obligation; Chytraus obligation; Oakwood Lease; 
and utilities. 
40. On or about May 2, 1985 when Erickson and Walsh signed the Sales 
Agreement, Promissory Note, Assignment and Assumption Agreement, and Consent 
to Assignment, Erickson told Walsh that, contrary to the Sales Contract language, 
the Jet Star sellers would not let her assume Walsh's obligations on the Jet Star 
contract, and that she was concerned about assuming Walsh's obligations on the 
Jet Star contract and the other debts. In response, Walsh assured Erickson that 
there would be enough business revenue from the Universal Video business to pay 
the debts. 
41. Further, regarding the debt to Robinson, Walsh told Erickson not to 
worry about the debt of $30,000.00 owed to him. 
42. At the time of the May 2, 1985 purported sale by Walsh to Erickson, or 
any time thereafter, Walsh did not inform Erickson that Van Alstyne had made 
demand on Walsh to help pay the Jet Star payoff May 31, 1985. 
43. Even though Van Alstyne and Robinson were unaware of the terms of 
the written documents pursuant to which Walsh purportedly sold his Partnership 
interest to Erickson, they were aware that Erickson, commencing May, 1985 
believed that she was entitled to be a partner in the Partnership. 
44. After May 2, 1985 disputes and negotiations ensued between Erickson 
and Van Alstyne. The principal dispute was Erickson's claim that she was a full 
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o n e - t h i r d par tner having to ta l ly replaced Walsh, and Van Alstvne's claim tha t she 
was not, primarily because she had not contr ibuted the $20,000.00 by June, 1985 
to help sat isfy Par tnership obligations. 
45. Between June, 1985 and spring, 1986, var ious set t lement negotiat ions 
ensued between Erickson. Van Alstyne and Robinson regarding Erickson's 
Par tnership s t a t u s . 
46. Erickson hired a lawyer to represent her agains t Van Alstyne in her 
claim of full one - th i rd pa r tne r s t a t u s . 
47. Though severa l proposals were made back and forth, no agreement was 
ever reached between Van Alstyne, Robinson and Erickson regarding her s t a t u s as 
a pa r tne r in the Universal Video Par tnership . 
48. At no time did Robinson or Van Alstyne ever agree or consent to 
having Erickson replace Walsh as a par tner , even though there were times when 
Robinson or Van Alstyne contemplated accepting Erickson as an addit ional, not a 
replacement, par tner , and they made various offers to Erickson regarding th i s . 
49. At no time did Robinson or Van Alstyne ever release Walsh from his 
obligations to pay the Universal Video business debts . 
50. Van Alstyne mortgaged his family residence to obtain funds to loan the 
Par tnersh ip $30,000.00 in June , 1985, to pay on the Je t Star contract . 
51 . In the spring of 1985, Van Alstyne had told Walsh he might buy Walsh's 
Par tnersh ip r ights and obligat ions for $2,000.00, but t ha t Van Alstyne would do so 
only if Walsh would first pay enough to contr ibute with Van Alstyne to satisfy 
the Par tnership obligations. 
52. In the spring of 1985, before completing the 330,000.00 payoff to Je t 
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Star, Van Alstyne made demand on Walsh to help sat isfy the Partnership 
obligations. Walsh refused, tell ing Van Alstyne he was facing bankruptcy and t h a t 
he hadn ' t the asse ts to spend on those obligations. Van Alstyne made subsequent 
demands on Walsh and again was refused by Walsh. 
53. The Oakwood Lease obligation, approximately $1,500.00 monthly ren t 
from January , 1985 through June, 1986, was satisfied from the Universal Video 
Par tnersh ip business revenue. 
54. All but $6,038.18 of the Chytraus contrac t obligations were sat isf ied 
from the Universal Video Par tnership business revenue . 
55. After several unsuccessful a t tempts to sell the Universal Video 
bus iness , Van Alstyne and Robinson on or about June 23, 1986 sold i ts inventory 
to Video USA for the sum of $25,835.00 payable with $5,835.00 down and monthly 
payments of $682.00 for 36 months, the las t payment due May, 1989. 
56. Van Alstyne's personal financial loss from his loans to the Par tnersh ip 
business for satisfying the business debts is as follows: 
$30,000.00 a t 10% per annum June 3, 1985 for discounted payment 
on Je t Star (Defendants' Exhibit 25] 
$ 5,200.00 a t 13% per annum December 18, 1985 for one -ha l f of 
$6,038.00 final payment to Chytraus and one -ha l f of 
$4,362.00 final payment on Je t Star contract 
$13,493.65 Total in te res t a t the above specified 10% and 13% ra t e s 
$48,693.65 TOTAL VAN ALSTYNE PERSONAL FINANCIAL LOSS FROM 
HIS LOANS TO THE PARTNERSHIP BUSINESS FOR 
SATISFYING THE BUSINESS DEBTS 
57. In addition to the ini t ia l $30,000.00 loan a t 19.41% per annum, Robinson 
loaned the business $5,200.00 a t 13% per annum December 18, 1985 for one -ha l f of 
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the $6,038.00 final payment to Chytraus and one-ha l f of the $4,632.00 final 
payment on the Je t Star Contract. 
58. Robinson's loss from the loans set forth in the previous paragraph, after 
applying all of the Video USA sale proceeds to offset Robinson's loss, is 
$10,718.45 through May 21 , 1989. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters i t s 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Terms of the Par tnership Agreement between Walsh, Van Alstyne, 
and Robinson were as se t forth in paragraph 2 of the Facts above. In summary, 
in exchange for Robinson's loan of the $30,000.00 s t a r t - u p funds for the bus iness , 
Walsh and Van Alstyne agreed: (a) to repay Robinson; (b) to be responsible for 
the pa r tne r sh ip business debts; and (c) to share in equal thirds with Robinson the 
bus iness profi ts , even though it finally turned out t h a t there were no business 
prof i ts . 
a. Debts to Robinson: Walsh as a manager of the Par tnership 's 
Universal Video business with responsibi l i ty to manage the business so as to pay 
i t s debts , is responsible to repay Robinson for one-ha l f of Robinson's loans to the 
Pa r tne r sh ip as se t forth in the fActs above. The debt to Robinson, after 
credi t ion to Robinson all of the proceeds of the June, 1986 sale of the Universals 
Video inven tory to Video USA, to ta l s $10,718.45 with in te res t through May 21 , 
1989 for one -ha l f t h a t sum (paragraph 57, Facts above). Robinson should be 
granted judgment against Walsh effective May 21 , 1989 against walsh for one -ha l f 
of t h a t sum, $5,359.23 
b. Other par tnersh ip Business debts for which Walsh owes Van Alstyne: 
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Pursuant to the terms of the Partnership agreement (paragraph 2, Facts above), 
Walsh and Van Alstyne, and not Robinson, were equally responsible for the 
business debts to Chytraus, Jet Star, Oakwood, and other business creditors. 
Pursuant to his right of contribution per Section 48-1-15(1), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against Walsh effective 
May 21, 1989 against Walsh for $24,346.82, which represents one-half of Van 
Alstyne's $48,693.65 loss form paying those creditors from his personal funds 
(paragraph 59, Facts above). 
2. Walsh is liable for breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne and Robinson: 
"Partners . . . occupy a fiduciary relationship and must deal with each other in 
the utmost good faith." Burke \r. Farrell, 656 P.2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1982) citing 
section 48-1-18, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The Court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that Walsh breached his fiduciary duty to Van 
Alstyne and Robinson in several regards, including the following: 
a. Before borrowing the $30,000.00 form Robinson to purchase the 
Universal Video business under the Jet Star Contract, Walsh was wary of the debt 
service on the contract and was concerned that the business revenue would not 
cover the debt serve, let alone the loan payments to Robinson and the other 
business debts, and yet he borrowed the $30,000.00 from Robinson and had Van 
Alstyne cosign with Walsh on the underlying contracts and personal guarantee to 
Chytraus without warning Van Alstyne and Robinson of the risk involved. 
b. Walsh abandoned the Partnership May 2, 1985, leaving Van Alstyne 
to manage and pay the debts of a business in which he had virtually no 
experience, and leaving the debt to Robinson unpaid. 
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c. Walsh attempted to sell his partnership interest to Erickson without 
fully disclosing to Van Alstyne and Robinson the terms of the sale and without 
informing them that he received $5,500.00 from Erickson. 
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the said breaches of 
fiduciary duty were done by Walsh in a manner that showed a knowing and 
reckless indifference to and disregard of the rights of Van Alstyne and Robinson, 
and that Walsh either knew or should have known that he said conduct would, in 
a high degree of probability, result in substantial harm to Van Alstyne and 
Robinson. 
For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Van Alstyne, Van Alstyne should be 
granted judgment against Walsh for $24,346.82 actual damages. 
For Walsh's breach of fiduciary duty to Robinson, Robinson should be 
granted judgment against Walsh for $5,359.23 actual damages. 
3. Validity of Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement: The Sales Agreement 
entered into by Walsh and Erickson May 2, 1985 [Defendants' Exhibit 12] is void 
for lack of consideration and void for failure of consideration. Section I of the 
Agreement purported to convey to Erickson all of Walsh's one-third partnership 
rights and interest in the Universal Video business. Walsh did not have the 
authority or right to convey his Partnership rights. Walsh's sale to Erickson was 
tantamount to the proverbial "sale of the Brooklyn Ridge". Walsh's promise to 
convey all of his partnership rights to Erickson was illusory because it required 
approval (never obtained) by Van Alstyne and Robinson. 
When there exists only the facade of a promise, i.e., a 
statement . . . such . . . that the person making it commits 
himself to nothing, the alleged "promise" is said to be 
"illusory". An illusory promise, neither binds the person 
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making it, 1 Corbin on Contracts Section 145 (1963), nor 
functions as consideration for a return promise. IcL at 628. 
Resource Management Company v^ Weston Ranch and Livestock Company Inc., 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Thus the Sales Agreement is void for lack of 
consideration because Walsh's promise to convey his Partnership rights to 
Erickson was illusory because it committed Walsh to nothing because he had no 
legal right to make that commitment without consent from Van Alstyne and 
Robinson. 
Even if the Sales Agreement were not void for lack of consideration, it is 
void for failure of consideration. When consideration is lacking, there is no 
contract. When consideration fails, there was a contract when the agreement was 
made, but the promised performance has failed. DeMentas v^ Estate of Tallas, 95 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Utah App. 1988). Walsh failed to deliver the consideration 
(his Partnership rights) to Erickson because he was never authorized to do so by 
the other partners, Van Alstyne and Robinson. 
a. All partners' consents are required for sale of partner's rights: 
Pursuant to Sections 48-1-21 and 48-1-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
both Van Alstyne's and Robinson's consent would be required to imbue Erickson 
with Walsh's Partnership rights (as apposed to his mere Partnership interest, 
which is the partner's right to profits) to manage or administer Partnership 
business or affairs. 
b. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson consented, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement. Van Alstyne and Robinson did 
not even see the document until this lawsuit was filed. After Erickson signed the 
documents and began paying Walsh the $500.00 monthly installments, several 
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months of arguments ensued between Erickson and Van Alstyne because Van 
Alstyne and Robinson did not ever accept Erickson as a full one - th i rd par tner to 
replace Walsh. 
c. Neither Van Alstyne nor Robinson released Walsh from his 
Par tnersh ip obligations. The fact t h a t Van Alstyne and Robinson made significant 
Par tnersh ip business decisions after May 1, 1985 without consulting Walsh does 
not imply a release of Walsh or a consent to his sale to Erickson. Walsh 
abandoned the par tnersh ip May 2, 1985. Section 4 8 - 1 - 6 , Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, provides t h a t a pa r tne r who abandons the Partnership business 
does not have to be included in other pa r tne r s ' decisions to sell or assign 
Par tnersh ip property. There was no novat ion to subs t i t u t e Erickson for Walsh to 
pay Walsh's Par tnership obligat ions. "For a novat ion to occur, there must be (1) 
an exis t ing and valid cont rac t , (2) an agreement to the new contract by all 
pa r t i e s , (3) a new valid cont rac t , and (4) an ext inguishment of the old contrac t 
by the new one." Hormana v^ Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1352-1353 (Utah App. 1987). 
See also Firs t American Commerce Company v^ Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 
743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987); and D.A. Taylor Company v^ Paulson, 552 P.2d 1274 
(Utah 1976). 
d. Neither mistake of fact nor mistake of law by Erickson or 
Walsh would val idate the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement. Even if Walsh and 
Erickson both mistakenly believed when they entered into the Sales Agreement 
t h a t Van Alstyne and Robinson had consented to the Agreement, t ha t mistake 
would not be grounds for va l ida t ing the Sales Agreement, Langston v^ McQuarrie, 
741 P.2d 544 (Utah App. 1987); Mooney v^ GR and Associates , 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
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App. 1987). To allow such a mistake of fact to validate the Sales Agreement 
would be analogous to validating a contract for sale of the Brooklyn Bridge by a 
seller who believed he had legal rights to sell the bridge but who in fact did not. 
Rather than being validated because it was obtained by mistake, the Sales 
Agreement is voidable because obtained by mistake. "An agreement obtained by 
misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake is generally voidable." Tanner v^ District 
Judges of the Third Judicial District Court, 649 P.2d 5,6 (Utah 1982) citing 17 Am. 
Jr. 2nd Contracts Section 143, et seq. 
Next, regarding mistake of law, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Walsh's 
or Erickson's mistake in legal interpretation of the Sales Agreement (mistakenly 
believing the Agreement was legally valid because of mistaken belief that 
partner's consent is not legal requirement for other partner 's sale of his 
Partnership rights) would not be grounds sufficient for validating the Agreement. 
Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982). 
e. The Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement is not severable so as to 
make Erickson liable to Walsh for the $10,000.00 contract price and award her 
only Walsh's Partnership interest (right to accounts receivable) instead of all of 
his Partnership rights (e.g., management rights not assignable without other 
partners' consent). There is no severability clause in the Sales Agreement. 
Section I of the Sales Agreement purports to sell all of Walsh's Partnership rights 
and interest in one total package. The Sales Agreement does not break down the 
$10,000.00 sales price into units separately specifying a certain sum for Walsh' 
Partnership rights and another sum for Walsh's Partnership interest. Further, 
there was no indication by Walsh or Erickson at trial of any intent by either of 
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them tha t the contract be severable . "A cont rac t is severable or ent i re depending 
on the in ten t of the par t ies at the time they entered into the contract ." 
Management Services Corp. v^ Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1980). 
4. Walsh was unjustly enriched a t Erickson's expense by his receiving and 
keeping the $5,500.00 which Erickson paid him from May 2, 1985 through October, 
1985 as instal lments on the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement. The Sales 
Agreement is void. Erickson received nothing of value from Walsh for the 
$5,500.00 she paid him. Erickson is en t i t led to judgment against Walsh for the 
$5,500.00 plus pre-judgment in te res t a t 10% per annum from and after October 31 , 
1985. 
Even if the Walsh-Erickson Sales Agreement were valid, Utah pa r tne r sh ip 
law would require Walsh to hold as t r u s t ee for the Par tnership the $5,500.00 and 
any other funds he received from Erickson under the Sales Agreement. 
Every par tner must account to the par tnersh ip for any 
benefit, and hold as t r u s t ee for i t any profits , derived by 
him without the consent of the other pa r tne r s from any 
t ransac t ion connected with the formation, conduct or 
l iquidation of the par tnersh ip or from any use by him of i t s 
property. 
Section 4 8 - 1 - 1 8 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The $5,500.00 was 
derived by Walsh from Erickson without the consent of Van Alstyne or Robinson 
and was connected with the conduct of the Par tnersh ip . Even if the Walsh-
Erickson Sales Agreement were Valid, Utah Law would require Walsh to disgorge 
the $5,500.00 to help Van Alstyne pay the Par tnersh ip debts . 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
Erickson should be granted judgment agains t Walsh as follows: 
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Actual damages of $5,500.00 (five thousand five hundred and no/100 dollars) 
plus 10% pre-judgment interest from October 31, 1985 for restitution of Walsh's 
unjust enrichment. 
Robinson should be granted judgment against Walsh as follows: 
Total actual damages of $5,359.23 (five thousand three hundred and fifty-nine 
and 23/100 dollars) plus 10% pre-judgment interest from and after May 21, 1987 
for Walsh's one-half share of the unpaid portion of the $30,000.00 loan and for 
repayment to Robinson of Walsh's one-half share of the unpaid portion of 
Robinson's $5,200.00 loan to the Partnership business December 18," 1985 to pay 
Chytraus and Jet Star. 
Van Alstyne should be granted judgment against Walsh as follows: 
Actual damages of $24,326.82 (twenty four thousand three hundred twenty six 
and 82/100 dollars) plus 10% pre-judgment interest from and after May 21, 1989 
pursuant to Van Alstyne's right of contribution, representing one-half of the 
partnership debts paid personally by Van Alstyne. 
DATED this 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, the undersigned, certify t h a t on the 1 day of October, 1990, I 
mailed a t rue and correct copy of t h e foregoing document by f i r s t - c l a s s mail to 
the following: 
Steven D. Crawley, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South 
Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84101 
John Walsh, Esq. 
3865 South Wasatch Blvd. 
Cove Point Plaza 
Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84109 
^ViAA^Atjh Wu^a, 
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